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“But the majesty of the moment should not make us forget that first elections in a transition are 
not meant to consolidate democracy. They are not the proverbial “cherry on top.” They are a 
tentative step in a path that meanders from chaos to stability, from fear to guarantees and 
safeguards, from annihilation of the “Other” to acceptance of his/her right to exist and have a 
voice.” -- Carina Perelli, former UN Chief of Elections  
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ABSTRACT 
 
While the military coup still accounts as one of the biggest direct threats to democracy, its effects 
today are not as irreversible and destructive as they once were. In this thesis, I examine what 
comes after the forceful seizure of a democratically-elected government. I am particularly 
interested in exploring what the prospects are for a country experiencing a coup to reverse its 
autocratic effects and pave the way toward a transition that will lead to more democratic 
outcomes. Because one tangible and integral features of democracies are competitive elections, I 
pay attention to the first national parliamentary election that happens after a military 
intervention. In doing so I ask the question: what strategies and factors of elections matter the 
most in affecting the long-term democratic outcomes following a military coup? I argue that the 
electoral timeline plays a major role in shaping democratic prospects. Specifically, I hypothesize 
that when electoral politics are temporized and introduced gradually--rather than rushing to 
implement them immediately or stalling indefinitely--the country will more likely follow a more 
democratic transition.  To test this hypothesis, I analyze three case studies: the coups of Pakistan 
1977, Turkey 1980, and Algeria 1992. I study the first post-coup national elections that happen 
in each of these cases, outlining how a number of electoral strategies are fulfilled in each of 
them, and what these elections mean for the country’s democratic prospects by looking at the 
indicators of voter turnout, electoral violence, changes in liberalization, and subsequent 
elections. After going through each case study to map out the political and historical 
circumstances surrounding each post-coup election and then comparing the three to one another, 
my findings confirm that time indeed is a significant variable in shaping democratic prospects, 
along with the degree of contestation and inclusion of the opposition. The empirical findings in 
this qualitative study may carry important implications for scholars, policymakers and political 
organizers studying or experiencing military-coup transitions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Last summer of 2013, millions of Egyptians took to the streets. By then, the scene was 
familiar. The world had gotten used to this image since the 2011 uprising when Egyptians 
reclaimed public space and made revolutionary slogans their own political genre, chanting 
“bread, freedom, dignity, social justice!” Unlike many of the day-to-day protests the public had 
become accustomed to since the 2011 uprising where smaller groups rallied together over more 
specific and local demands (for example, police reform, compensation for martyrs of the 
uprising, sacking corrupt officials, etc.), the protests that began on June 30, 2013 were 
widespread and brought together people of very different ideologies, motivations and 
expectations. But they all shared discontent for former President Muhammad Morsi’s Muslim 
Brotherhood-dominated government. Some called for early elections, others called for a vote of 
no confidence through a national referendum, and many were unambiguous with their 
resounding and all-too-familiar chants of Erhal! Leave!  
Whatever their demands, it was the military that moved the situation along. Just a day 
after the Tamarod (“rebel”) group began its mass protests, army chief General Abdelfattah El-
Sisi issued a 48-hour ultimatum to the incumbent government, warning that if the country’s 
various factions could not find a solution to the polarization, political deadlock and public’s 
dissatisfaction, the armed forces would be forced to seek a military solution and intervene to 
solve the crisis instead. The next day President Morsi addressed the nation, defending his 
administration vehemently and blaming the country’s political and economic problems on 
remnants of the previous regime. He made a few minor concessions, but it wasn’t what the 
opposition wanted to hear. They demanded nothing short of early elections or his resignation.  
On the eve of the ultimatum deadline, Morsi vowed to form a new consensus-driven 
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government, but during the same time opposition leaders were meeting with the military to 
design the next plan of action. On July 3rd, 2013, in a two-minute televised address, General El-
Sisi swiftly announced the dissolution of the country’s infant constitution, the annulment of what 
was left of parliament (the upper house had already been absolved by the judiciary at the end of 
2012), and the naming of the head of the supreme constitutional court as the country’s new 
interim president until fresh elections were held (through a vague roadmap set by the military). 
To be certain, many Egyptians supported the military intervention. It is what some 
scholars refer to as a “guardian coup” where people welcome the military stepping in in order for 
it to arbitrate and save the country from collapsing or falling into a civil war, as some 
characterized the alternative. At the same time, many who participated in the June 30 protests 
viewed the military’s action as a response to the demands of the public, rather than as the public 
bowing down or passively supporting the military’s desires and interests. A huge debate emerged 
both across Egypt and internationally about how to describe the events of June 30th to July 3rd. 
Some saw it as a classic example of a bloodless coup d'etat, while others vehemently opposed the 
label and described it as a second uprising or a “restoration” of the democratic January 25, 2011 
uprising. The very term “coup” became extremely politicized as it shed its technical definition 
and became used as a binary litmus test of support for the army and opposition to President 
Morsi, or vice versa.  
Much has been studied, debated and written extensively on why military interventions 
occur, what the varying levels of intervention look like, how militaries shape the democratic 
trajectory of revolutions, and, more generally, the nature of military coups and their outcomes. 
While these questions are important, because of the specific juncture Egypt finds itself in now, I 
am curious and concerned with the path it is heading down and what the current situation means 
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for the country’s democratic prospects that so many fought for demanded in the 2011 uprising. 
Especially as presidential and national parliamentary elections loom, I pay close attention to the 
outcomes of the transitional roadmap outlined by the military-backed government, and how it 
can be reevaluated and refined to support a more stable, secure and democratic transition.  
Egypt has entered a dangerous and gloomy stage of severe repression. The country has 
experience unprecedented levels of violence, with the clearing of Rabaa Square in August 
marked as the worst mass killing in Egypt’s modern history (Human Rights Watch, 2013). 
Political arrests, political trials and a severe crackdown and monitoring of the press ensures the 
government has a monopoly on influencing political perceptions and revising history as it sees 
fit. Even ownership of public spaces—something that truly sprung out in full force since the 
2011 uprising—is now under the tightening grip of security forces, whose crackdowns not only 
target public assemblies but also intimidate ordinary people off the streets through state-imposed 
curfews and road checkpoints. Whereas until recently the crackdown focused specifically on the 
Brotherhood and Morsi sympathizers, it is widening now to include any dissenting voices against 
the government and military at large. Although the military still enjoys wide approval from the 
public, we know from its brief yet highly mismanaged rule in 2011 that it does not hold complete 
impunity. Its popularity decreased as the economy plunged, military detentions for civilians 
increased, and the junta leaders stalled with no transparency on the democratic transition. If 
recent history is any guide, the military will continue to widen its witch-hunt, arbitrary detentions 
and violent targeting against more people of different political spheres. A recent law signed by 
the interim president criminalizes all protests and sit-ins. While this law may be intended to 
quash pro-Morsi protests, it carries implications for political parties, NGOs and activists 
organizing for various causes. A draft law aims to ban a burgeoning revolutionary tool, wall 
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graffiti, with four years in prison and a 100,000 LE fine for violators. Influential and leading 
activists Ahmed Maher and Alaa Abdelfattah, both key figures in the January 2011 uprising who 
are not Islamists or Morsi supporters, have been arrested for “attempting to influence the course 
of justice.” These steps are meant to quell dissident voices and institutionally criminalize public 
and political dissent.  
Meanwhile, President Adly Mansour has just passed a decree in early 2014 regulating the 
upcoming election, paving the way for General Sisi to run and win (El-Din, 2014). There has not 
yet been mention of parliamentary elections, which will be significantly important in 
determining the inclusion, relevance and positionality of various political players. Although 
electoral processes cannot be looked to as a panacea for curing decades of corruption and 
despotism, they can play a role in indicating the political trajectory of a country, and its prospects 
for democracy based on that path. Free and fair elections are crucial for democratization as they 
allow citizens to assert their self-determination by choosing their leadership (Marinov & 
Geomans, 2013). Scholars have noted that even if elections are not completely free and fair, for 
nine out of ten countries they are now much more competitive than they were before 1990 
(Marinov & Geomans, 2013).  Because of their necessity in building democratic societies, it is 
worth examining whether and how military coups can lead to liberalizing outcomes (Marinov & 
Geomans, 2013). Some may think that it is counterproductive or even ironic to study the post-
coup election in terms of what it means for democratization when the coup-makers who plotted it 
were obviously comfortable using unconstitutional, extrajudicial means to gain power--so why 
would they suddenly care to hold elections and risk losing that power? Isn’t the entire process 
irrelevant and farcical?  
But where elections are competitive in some form, where a political opposition is present 
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and more than one candidate can run for office and multiple parties are challenging the 
incumbent’s rule, elections are worth paying attention to--even if they are not operated in an 
ideal fashion. In competitive elections, as Nikolay and Marinov point out, coup leaders do not 
always run, and when they or their affiliates do, they do not always win (Marinov & Geomans, 
2013). Their own corporate interests  and control over large segments of the national economy 
may incentivize them to go back to the barracks. The NELDA datasets have found that in 78% of 
post-coup cases in the Cold War and 76% in the post-Cold War, coup leaders lost their power 
after elections (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). Using Polity sets to track these trends, the datasets 
also found that post-1991 coups resulted in more liberalization than pre-1991 post-coup 
elections. Additionally, 82% of post-coup elections, as recorded by international observers, were 
categorized as relatively free and fair (Marinov & Hyde, 2012). Furthermore, in the post-Cold 
War era, there has been a stronger shift to support restoring democratic processes after a coup, 
whether through fresh elections or reinstatement (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). A lot of times 
coup leaders hand over power because of their economic stakes. While coups in the pre-Cold 
War era usually installed long-term regimes and durable dictators, coups after 1990 usually are 
followed by competitive elections (Marinov & Geomans, 2013).  
Often, coup makers employ democratic strategies in the aftermath of intervention to  
justify their coup and gain acceptance or support for their actions. The legitimation strategies 
they have at their disposal are many including include issuing ultimatums, requesting public 
mandates of support, installing civilian leaders, and organizing constitutional reforms, economic 
reforms, transitional justice and elections.  
In this thesis, I pay particular attention to elections because of the many empirical and 
historical examples where the electoral process has been used post-coup to establish democracy, 
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or at least, restore a more stable and democratic transition. Whether there is genuine intention for 
democratic aspirations is something I cannot measure (though we can often have much reason to 
be skeptical of the intentions of coup leaders). What elections are used for in the post-
intervention period, however, beside legitimizing the coup or the coup leaders, is transitioning 
the country and moving it to a different stage from the one that it is in (which often is a situation 
of chaos, repression, polarization, instability and/or insecurity).  
For this thesis, I explore how post-coup military governments utilize electoral politics 
and what implications these actions have in shaping the country’s prospects for democracy. I will 
focus on the electoral process in the immediate aftermath of a coup as a determinant for stability, 
reconciliation and democratization in the long-term. To do this, I will first outline the different 
electoral strategies coup leaders have at their disposal when it comes to elections. The strategies I 
look at include the election timeframe 1 (announcing elections), election timeframe 2 (holding 
elections), the degree of opposition inclusion and contestation, and the degree of military 
interference. I will then look at the importance and relevance of each in shaping the election 
process and outcome. I measure “prospects for democracy” by looking at a number of different 
outcome variables that say something about the state of the country’s democratic robustness, or 
at least how democratic its transition is. These outcome variables include legitimacy of elections 
1 (voter turnout), legitimacy of elections 2 (electoral violence), change in political liberalization, 
acceptance of electoral results, and subsequent elections. 
While there is an urgency to understand Egypt’s trajectory, in order to understand it we 
must historicize and contextualize the post-coup election. To do this, I will begin with a 
preliminary hypothesis about the importance of electoral strategies in post-coup elections. I will 
then conduct a number of case studies as empirical examples and as a way to examine the 
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plausibility of my hypothesis. 
While many factors go into the making of the post-coup election order, I hypothesize that 
the most important factor in the historical chronology of a coup is the issue of election timing. I 
hypothesize that the primary electoral strategy that will affect the success of post-coup elections 
in restoring or opening up the potential for a democratic transition is the electoral timeframe (i.e. 
when elections are held). Specifically, I postulate that temporizing the electoral timeline and 
introducing electoral politics gradually in the post-coup aftermath increases the potential for a 
more democratic transition with increased stability and a more representative government. I 
hypothesize that delaying elections by three to five years in the post-coup time period increases 
the prospects for democratization because doing so allows factional tensions to de-escalate, 
political parties to regroup and organize and for ambitious constitutional, structural, and legal 
reforms to took root.  
In hypothesizing this, I realize that there are many other factors at play in determining 
post-coup outcomes. However, I argue that the timing of elections is most crucial in determining 
democratic prospects in the post-coup transition because rushing to implement elections leads to 
more agitation, resistance and violence from supporters of the previous incumbent who refuse to 
acknowledge or see other than the incumbent as the legitimate leader. While some may believe 
that quickly holding elections will deliver governance back to democracy more quickly, doing so 
would disproportionately benefit the military’s backed candidates, while especially 
marginalizing candidates of the previous incumbent party or parties. Even if carried out smoothly 
and quickly, military interventions are serious interruptions of political processes and the social 
order in ways that cannot be undone rapidly or easily. Their impact is more often than not lasting 
and takes much time to recover.   Quickly introducing elections also leads to unrest from other 
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opposition elements (not necessarily previous incumbents or previously active political forces) 
who feel as though they would have no time to mobilize, establish networks with constituencies 
and build their organizational power if elections were held quickly. On the contrary, elections 
that are delayed indefinitely or too extensively result in less accountability from the ruling junta 
and breed apathy in voters over time. Delaying elections for a lengthy period of time without 
evident pressure from the public leads to the praetorian regime to become long term military 
regimes, with a restoration of the democratic process greatly less likely.  In other words, I argue 
that timing is the most important electoral  strategy, and even if all of the other favorable 
electoral strategies were employed but the elections were held right away, then we would not 
witness strong or promising prospects for democracy following a country’s post-coup transition.  
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THEORY AND METHODS 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Explanatory Variables (e.g. electoral strategies)  
 
In this thesis, my independent variables are the various electoral strategies and approaches coup 
makers have in shaping and influencing election outcomes. I have classified these explanatory 
variables into four categories: Time Frame (elections announced), Time Frame (elections held), 
Degree of Contestation and Opposition Inclusion, and Degree of Military Interference. In this 
section, I describe how I operationalize each one, what indicators and sources I am consistently 
using to calculate each variable, and my justifications for doing so.  
 
Explanatory Variable Indicators  
Time Frame (elections announced) No. of months before announcing election date 
Time Frame (elections held) No. of months before holding parliamentary 
elections  
Degree of contestation & opposition inclusion 0-4 scale (with zero being the least inclusive, and 
4 the most inclusive) 
 
0 = Only the ruling party can run 
1 = A finite amount can run but all prior parties 
cannot 
2 = All parties can run except for the prior main 
opposition   
3= All candidates can run but not through formal 
parties 
4 = All parties are included can run 
Degree of military interference 0 = no interference; the military hands elections to 
a completely independent election committee  
1 = the military may be interfering behind the 
scenes through talks with leaders or ambiguous 
speech; the military is interfering in general terms 
(e.g. by urging public to vote but not  backing a 
specific party or candidate)  
2 = there is a strong military presence in election 
spaces; they are primarily the ones observing 
elections; they bar international or independent 
voting monitors; they clearly influence voting 
patterns; there is poll rigging  
3 = the military is funding specific parties; 
backing candidates and parties and urging the 
public to vote for them through speeches, 
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advertising campaigns, etc.; the military is only 
allowing parties it deems fit to run 
4 = coup leaders and members of the military (or 
retired generals) are contesting elections directly 
5 = military leaders stage a coup to prevent or 
annul results 
 
Time Frame 1 
This factor examines how quickly coup leaders announce or call for elections. That is, when do 
they mention elections, but more specifically, when do they set a timeframe or specific date for 
when it will be held? This variable is measured by recording the number of months before the 
coup leaders announce the election timetable (e.g. not just saying there will be elections but 
actually announcing what month and year they will be held). This variable will be determined 
through second hand sources that trace the first mention of elections including newspaper articles 
from the time period (e.g. The New York Times, Milliyet, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Christian 
Science Monitor, etc.).  
 
Time Frame 2 
This factor measures how quickly coup leaders actually hold elections. It is measured by the 
number of months before parliamentary elections are held after the coup. This variable is also 
measured by looking through the historical archives of newspapers and locating when the first 
mention is made of elections occurring (e.g. The New York Times, Milliyet, The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, Christian Science Monitor, etc.).  
 
Degree of Political Contestation and Opposition Inclusion 
This variable represents how much contestation the ruling party permits in the first post-coup 
parliamentary elections. It measures how all political parties including the opposition are dealt 
with vis–à–vis the state. Informed by notions of Robert Dahl on polyarchy and political 
participation, I focus on opposition parties and look at the ways in which they are formally or 
informally included or excluded, and how this translates into overall inclusion and contestation 
in elections (Luong & Lust-Okar, 2002). It is measured not simply by examining how many 
parties are running (although that does carry weight), but primarily by measuring the range of 
candidates in the election that represent various interests of voters and how full the array of 
options they have is. It also considers the number of new political parties or non-previous 
incumbent parties contesting the election, as well as independents. This factor also represents the 
reason behind the number of parties contesting elections. Are there parties running at all? Is the 
number of parties particularly low? If so, is this due to voluntary reasons by parties (boycott, 
post-coup apathy/distrust in system, etc.) or through force (laws that prohibit certain parties from 
running e.g. previous parties, small parties, leftist parties, etc.) or both? This factor also 
demonstrates how thoroughly the opposition is included into the electoral process. Do opposition 
forces participate in elections? Is the main prior opposition or prior incumbent included? If yes, 
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under what conditions? If no, is it due to voluntarily reasons (e.g. boycotts) or by force (political 
exclusion laws) or both? For example, the military incumbents might decide to formally exclude 
all parties from participating, but allow them to informally organize and participate in elections 
as independents. They might decide to include a limited amount of parties, but have them only 
discuss issues set within the parameters allowed by the ruling junta (Luong & Lust-Okar, 2002). 
Alternatively, they may allow all parties to run, except the main prior incumbent/current 
opposition it deems as a threat and sought to quell before through forceful regime change.  
 
This variable is measured by a continuum of 0-4, with 0 being the least inclusive and competitive 
and 4 being the most. 0 means only the ruling party can run, 1 means a finite amount can run but 
most prior opposition parties cannot, 2 means all parties except for the prior main opposition can 
run, 3 means parties cannot run formally but all candidates can run, and 4 means all parties are 
included and can run.  
 
0-4 scale (0 being the least inclusive, and 4 the most inclusive) 
 
0 = Only the ruling party can run 
1 = A finite amount can run but all prior parties cannot 
2 = All parties can run except for the prior main opposition   
3= All candidates can run but not through formal parties 
4 = All parties are included can run 
 
In determining how the opposition is included, I aim to to analyze what ways the military leaders 
are trying to fragment, shape and manipulate the opposition (Luong & Lust-Okar, 2002).  
This factor is determined by studying electoral datasets that outline what parties ran in and 
contested parliamentary elections (e.g. election handbooks including Elections in Asia, Elections 
in Africa, reports by international election observers, etc.)  
 
Degree of Military Interference 
This variable measures how much the coup-leaders and the military at large interfere in the post-
coup election. While initially I had coded this variable as a simple “yes” or “no” for interference, 
the degrees of interference vary too much and too subtly for this categorization to be effective. 
Instead, I have classified military interference through a ranking system on a scale of 0-5, with 0 
delineating no interference and 5 as the staging of a coup.  
 
The ranking system is as follows: 
 
0 = no interference; the military hands elections to a completely independent election committee  
1 = the military may be interfering behind the scenes through talks with leaders or ambiguous 
speech; the military is interfering in general terms (e.g. by urging public to vote but not  backing 
a specific party or candidate)  
2 = there is a strong military presence in election spaces; they are primarily the ones observing 
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elections; they bar international or independent voting monitors; they clearly influence voting 
patterns; there is poll rigging  
3 = the military is funding specific parties; backing candidates and parties and urging the public 
to vote for them through speeches, advertising campaigns, etc.; the military is only allowing 
parties it deems fit to run 
4 = coup leaders and members of the military (or retired generals) are contesting elections 
directly 
5 = military leaders stage a coup to prevent or annul results 
 
This variable is determined by examining primary sources (speeches of military leaders 
regarding different political parties and the upcoming elections, television and media 
propaganda, etc.) and secondary sources  (newspaper headlines and articles, scholarly journal 
articles and books that cite the different ways the coup leaders scrutinized or manipulated 
elections and parties).  
 
Outcome Variables (e.g. measures of democratic prospects) 
 
In this section, I outline the outcome variables produced by electoral strategies. The indicators of 
these variables offer substantial ways of measuring democratization prospects for the post-coup 
period.  
 
Outcome Variable Indicators  
Legitimacy of Election Voter turnout 
Legitimacy of Election Organized/reported electoral violence 
Change in Political Liberalization Change in civil rights after elections: Did they 
regain pre-coup levels? By how much (or how 
little)? Looks at change 1 year after the 
elections then 5 years after the election 
Acceptance of Electoral Results Are elected representatives able to take office 
and are recognized by the incumbent 
government?  
Subsequent elections Do the next scheduled elections occur as 
scheduled?  
 
Legitimacy of Elections 1: Voter Turnout 
This outcome measures the legitimacy of elections in the eyes of the public. This factor can help 
us understand post-coup prospects for democracy because if there is consensus that the elections 
are legitimate, citizens (the opposition included) are more likely to participate and trust in the 
electoral process. To be certain, the ballot box is only one factor of many when looking at the 
democratic potential of a country, but political science scholars have long understood it to be an 
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important one nonetheless as it can reflect the prospects for democratic consolidation, constituent 
satisfaction, political attitudes, partisan distribution of the vote, and other outcomes (Alexander, 
2002). I measure legitimacy of elections 1 by studying the voter turnout of the election. Voter 
turnout, the percentage of eligible voters who cast their votes (including those whose ballot is 
invalid or blank), can be a good marker of democratic participation and democratic legitimacy. 
This factor is determined through electoral datasets that outline what parties ran in and contested 
parliamentary elections (e.g. election handbooks including Elections in Asia, Elections in 
Africa).  
 
Legitimacy of Elections 2: Electoral Violence 
This outcome used to measure the democratic prospects of a country regarding its post-coup 
elections represents levels of electoral violence. Election disputes are often used to delegitimize 
the electoral process by demonstrating the lack of objectivity and fairness in elections. Violence 
can be an option used to tamper with or influence the outcome of elections, either by the 
incumbents, the opposition or by both. It may be used to disrupt the elections altogether and 
make sure it is deemed invalid, or it can be used to block certain sectors of society from casting 
their votes. I will measure this outcome by examining second hand materials including 
newspapers that discuss the elections at hand and look to whether they make mention of reported 
violence or other disruptive irregularities occurring during the election. I determine systematic 
violence during elections and leading up to it based on reported accounts of injuries, deaths and 
destructive incidents via news sources and election reports by international and independent 
observer organizations.  
 
Change in Political Liberalization  
Because political and civil liberalization complements democratization processes (Alexander, 
2002), I include this variable as an indicator of post-coup prospects for democracy. This outcome 
measures change in political liberalization before and after the post-coup election as a way to 
determine if the election was followed by greater or less liberalization. This outcome will be 
measured through changes in political liberalization over time: changes before the coup, after the 
coup, and after the first post-coup election. The primary indicator I use to determine this change 
over time is through measuring changes in civil and political rights before and after elections. 
Did civil rights increase or decrease one year following the post-coup election? Did civil rights 
increase or decrease five years after that election? I look to see if political liberalization after 
elections regains pre-coup levels, exceeds it or plummets entirely. 
 
I quantify political liberalization and changes in civil and political rights by analyzing trends and 
changes in Freedom House’s Freedom Ratings (where 1 is the most free and 7 is the least free) 
that combine the scores of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Political rights are measured 
based on a country’s “electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and function of 
government,” while civil liberties are based on “freedom of expression and belief, associational 
and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights” (Freedom 
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House, 2013). To do this, I calculate differences in scores from right before the pre-coup, to right 
after the coup, to right after the first post-coup parliamentary election, to the second 
parliamentary post-coup election (usually 3-5 years for elections to recur).  
 
I also  track and include secondary sources (newspapers) that  capture the political consciousness 
and liberalization attitudes of the time period (e.g. reports and news on arrests, executions, 
purging faculties, disbanding student organizations, installing military general in academic 
bureaucratic/academic positions, etc.).  
 
Acceptance of Electoral Results 
This outcome variable represents whether the elected leader or representatives with the most 
votes are able to take office. Do coup leaders recognize their victory? Do opposition factions or 
boycotters recognize their victory? If not, is their rejection relevant and what are the implications 
of it?  
 
While I do take note of the responses of different political sectors of society, I calculate 
“acceptance” primarily by looking at acceptance from members of the incumbent government 
because their approval is fundamental in whether the elected representatives are sworn in.  
 
I use primary sources (speeches, press releases, public statements) and second hand sources 
(newspapers, magazines) to determine this variable.  
 
Subsequent Elections  
This outcome variable determines whether the incoming incumbent government is able to finish 
its term and whether the next national parliamentary elections occur as scheduled. After the first 
post-coup elections, did elections occur again after the completion of the incumbent’s term? I 
measure this by ascribing a label of “yes” or “no” to whether the election happened. I measure 
this factor through electoral datasets that list all elections of a given country and I determine the 
soonest election following the post-coup election (e.g. election handbooks including Elections in 
Asia, Elections in Africa).  
 
While I am concerned with whether or not the newly elected government is able to finish its term 
and the next elections happen on time, I realize there is more complexity and depth in 
determining the actual democratic consolidation that grows out of the election. Democratic 
consolidation implies that all actors engaging in politics have pro-democratic tendencies and a 
democratic government is unlikely to be reversed regardless of changing events and players 
(Alexander, 2002). Therefore, my typology that measures whether the post-coup elections led to 
a more democratic, somewhat democratic, or less democratic government takes this into 
consideration for this outcome variable. 
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CASE SELECTION 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, a majority of countries in the world 
experienced at least one coup attempt (Sing, 2013). Between 1950 and 2000, 471 independent 
countries underwent coups (Singh, 2013). To draw the most similar case design in studying and 
comparing military coups, I focus on Pakistan, Turkey and Algeria as the three primary case 
studies that guide this thesis. Military coup leaders are likely to use similar strategies in similar 
populations and contexts, so I chose countries with comparable circumstances in order to control 
as much as possible for confounding variables. All three of these case studies contain coups that 
occurred during the third wave of democratization, when many developing countries were 
transitioning to constitutional democracies--these countries stand out then, as countries that were 
experiencing drastic disruptions to democracy instead. The three countries share similar 
socioeconomic and demographic contexts at the time of their coups, with similar levels of 
poverty and education at the time of the coups. They are all predominantly Muslim countries and 
were emerging democracies at the time leading up to their respective coups. In each of these 
three cases all of these coups overthrew or interrupted democratic or popularly elected 
incumbents. Furthermore, all of these countries at the time of their coups had strong militaries, as 
exemplified by high military spending and a sense of popular allegiance and prestige afforded to 
the armed forces because of their role in the origins of the state. 
In this thesis, I pay close attention to the first parliamentary election held in the post-coup 
period. Therefore, my case studies are: Turkey’s 1983 Grand National Assembly election, 
Pakistan’s 1985 National Assembly election, Algeria’s 1997 Peoples National Assembly 
election.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Scholars of military interventions have written extensively about the implications of the 
military coup, noting that three out of four democracy failures in the world have come from 
coups (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010). Because coup politics have been a key marker of 
this time period, they deserve examination as they often prompt pivotal moments in history felt 
both locally and internationally.  
Much has been written on the military coup, its motivations and causes, the internal 
dynamics of coup-plotters, and the different components of coup risk. Scholars of civil-military 
relations have studied and characterized the types of countries that most frequently undergo 
coups. Understanding the explanations of coup-risk and coup causes as well as structural 
components that lead up to intervention help us understand whether what happened in Egypt on 
June 3rd, 2013, for example, is not novel or extraordinary as both people in and outside of Egypt 
sought to characterize it after the military intervention last summer. Professor Naunihal Singh’s 
new publication, Seizure of Power, highlights the conditions that facilitate coups based on his 
own statistical analysis of hundreds of coup attempts. His findings suggest that coups more often 
occur “in countries that are less economically developed, with governments that are neither 
highly democratic nor highly dictatorial, and which have recently experienced at least one other 
coup attempt. In other words, coup attempts happen in countries like Egypt” (Singh, 2013). 
Indeed, scholars have documented that popular protests coupled or followed by coups are not 
anomalies but have happened frequently over history [see Iran 1979, Philippines 1986, Romania 
1989, Ecuador 2000] (Singh, 2013).  
The coup, as described by political scientist Eric Nordlinger, is “a situation in which 
military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened 
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use of force” (Nordlinger, 1977). Nordlinger has examined the ways military governments deal 
with a number of issues after seizing power, including those that adopt changes to justify 
themselves as an effective and progressive force (Nordlinger, 1977).  
Another important factor in the discussion on military coups is the concept of legitimacy, 
or about the incumbent’s right to rule. Scholars have sought to explain that when there is a 
common readiness to use institutionalized procedures to address grievances and disputes, and 
when there are laws and policies in place to prevent abuses from executive powers, then the 
opposition is not likely to externally appeal to the military to intervene in politics. By the same 
token, the army is unlikely to turn against the government unless it thinks that some significant 
segment of society would feel the same as it and support its actions. Political scientists Marinov 
and Geomans have also discussed political legitimacy and explain that a lack of it is often the 
result of economic decline and weak political institutions. A lack of legitimacy, they argue, leads 
to political instability (through parliamentary deadlock or street protests) (Marinov & Geomans, 
2013). In describing which countries experiencing coups are most likely to hold elections, they 
conclude that countries with more democratic political institutions make it more likely for coup 
leaders to arrange elections and hand over power because of public perceptions that the military 
belongs in the barracks and should not meddle directly in politics for too long. 
Other scholars have sought to show how economic influences affect whether the military 
rulers decide to hold onto power or move sooner to elections (Powell, 2012). For example, coup 
leaders will often rush to make deals about foreign funding as soon as they seize office. Consider 
the recent case of Egypt, where coup leaders and the military-backed government hastened to 
secure support of the Saudi and Gulf governments once they realized that support from Qatar, the 
United States and other benefactors may be shaky because of their assault on democratic 
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electoral processes (or perhaps because of who they overthrew).  
All these economic, social, and political factors clearly may reinforce one another and are 
highly interconnected. Social perceptions, the identity and characteristic of the coup-makers, 
economic incentives, and international relations all must be taken into consideration when 
determining how military leaders react after a coup--particularly, whether or not and how soon 
they decide to hold elections.  
Because this thesis focuses on post-coup electoral politics, my research is concerned with 
what comes after the coup--particularly, what has been written about “undoing” the harmful 
effects of coups and paving a democratic post-coup transition. Scholars of praetorianism--a 
militarist system where the armed forces intervene for regime change--have sought to outline the 
different pathways coup makers carve and take after a forceful seizure of power. They discuss 
why some seek to hold elections and transfer power, while others seek to rule and formulate 
policy on their own (Geddes, 1999).  
Whereas, before 1999, especially before the Cold War, coups used to produce long-term 
leaders, they now are usually followed by competitive elections. Scholars have noted that before 
1991, most coups did not have elections soon and were leaders for life; whereas, coups after 
1992 usually held elections within five years (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). Coups are harmful to 
democratization, but in general, their effects today are not as permanently damaging and harmful 
to democracy as they once were. This is why coups and particularly their aftermaths are worthy 
of our attention. 
Scholars Nikolay and Marinov have noted that post-Cold War international pressures 
were largely responsible for shaping the consequences of countries after coups. Their extensive 
research and case studies aimed to explore what factors affected a post-coup government’s 
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likelihood of holding elections afterwards versus which ones were likely to install durable 
dictators (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). These academics argue that because the international 
community’s position is key in shaping outcomes, perhaps even more so than domestic opinion 
and the influences of the junta leaders themselves, then perhaps democratic failures that result 
from a coup are more reversible if coup makers are penalized for their actions. They therefore 
look at it from a preventative standpoint, where anticipating elections after the intervention may 
cause coup plotters to think twice about organizing a coup in the first place. They found that 
those countries who were dependent on US aid were more likely to hold competitive elections 
after a coup.  
Nikolay and Marinov note that after the Cold War, western international players pledged 
to support democracy-building abroad by punishing coup attempts. In 1991, the EU made a 
commitment to cut aid for those who overthrow elected governments, while the US in 1997 
passed legislation in Congress to suspend aid for countries that undergo a coup (Powell & Thyne, 
2011). These scholars explain that such decisions are motivated by a western understanding that 
a liberal international order is necessary for its long-term strategic interests (Powell & Thyne, 
2011). While international players may not be able to directly affect how and whether a coup is 
carried out (though that certainly is possible and has been done), they can quickly affect the turn 
a recipient government and country will take after the coup based on patron-client stipulations.  
Marinov and Geomans have also sought to explain the pathway in the post-coup 
aftermath by understanding what kind of change the coup makers sought when they came into 
power. What kind of status quo or policy change did the coup leaders seek? Having decided on 
one (or against one), they have to think then about what elections would do if they were to hold 
them during a specific point in time. Would it reproduce the same result and reinstate the ousted 
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government, or would it lead to a change that aligns with their partisan views? For example, in 
Algeria 1992, the military annulled elections right after the first round to avoid similar results. If 
the military were to hold competitive elections soon after the coup, they would probably face the 
same results where the FIS would win again. Whereas, in Egypt, after the military ousted the 
Morsi government in 2013, if the military holds parliamentary elections soon (which it looks to 
be the case), it would work in their favor since the typical voter’s preference more closely aligns 
with the military’s (rather than the prior incumbent). Here, the main variable at play in deciding 
whether or not to hold elections, and how soon, is the incumbent’s popularity. If the 
incumbent/ousted government enjoys popular support, then holding elections, or holding them 
sooner, would not work in the military’s favor--so it is likely something they would avoid.  
Marinov and Geomans suggest that it may only be “worthwhile” to have a coup and 
intend to have elections if the incumbent is not popular; that way the coup leaders have 
something to gain in terms of policy change and can take power then give it up through elections 
to actualize their goal (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). While I agree with this notion, a more 
nuanced approach to this issue needs to ask whether there is a specific policy orientation the 
coup-leaders seek or if it simply seeks any alternative to the previous incumbent. On the other 
hand, scholars have noted that if the coup-plotters’ vision for policy is more distant to the median 
voter than that of the incumbent government’s, then they probably would not be likely to hold 
elections--or if they did, they would not be democratic or at all competitive (Marinov).  
While these findings and research on deciding whether or not elections will happen are 
important in elevating the discourse on the post-coup aftermath, they do not address the 
foundational issue of what kind of conditions in elections lead to more democratic processes. 
Though the current literature sheds light on what holding elections during a certain point in time 
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would do in terms of realizing the goals of the coup makers, it does not closely consider what it 
would do overall in terms of cultivating more favorable democratic prospects. My goal, then, is 
to deepen this perspective by deconstructing the different electoral strategies available in shaping 
elections, and tracing which of these strategies are most salient in producing long-term 
democratic outcomes. 
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CASE STUDY 1: TURKEY 1983 
 
We begin with Turkey because out of the three case studies, it had the longest history of 
civilian and democratic governance prior to its coup. Turkey was not part of the third wave of 
democracy, but rather of the second wave when it transitioned to democratic politics in the 1940s 
(Ozbudun, 2000). Since its founding in 1923 by Kamal Ataturk, Turkey has experienced many 
interventions by the military: a coup in 1960, a “coup by memorandum” in 1971, a coup in 1980, 
a “post-modern” coup in 1997 and, what some have dubbed, an “e-memorandum” in 2007 (an 
ultimatum that threatened the possibility of a coup but didn’t result in a regime change). For this 
thesis, I focus on the 1980 coup in Turkey as a primary case study because of its seminal 
historical significance.  
The country experienced its first coup in 1960 as tensions between the government and 
opposition escalated dramatically. The military’s officers were losing patience with the 
increasingly poor economic state under the rule of the Democratic Party, as well what they 
perceived to be the army’s growingly diminishing prestige as their incomes were slashed and the 
period of mandatory military service was shortened by the government. The Democratic Party (a 
center right) government, headed by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, was seen as weakening 
and not abiding by the strictly secularist policies of Kemalism. Instead, it was viewed as 
strengthening religious freedoms and giving religion more of a public and visible position 
throughout the country (through its reopening of mosques that were shut down by the previous 
Republican People’s Party, opening up of schools for religious authorities, allowing the call to 
prayer to be recited in Arabic, etc.). At the same time, the government was accused of clamping 
down on certain media outlets and implementing laws that would restrict press freedoms (Birand, 
1987). The government soon imposed martial law to address the growing disorder and tensions 
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that turned from a handful of urban-areas to a nationwide crisis. A few months later, seeing that 
the emergency law was not having its desired effect, the military staged a coup, overthrowing the 
Democratic Party government, executing Menderes and introducing new amendments to the 
constitution that gave the armed forces more autonomy than ever before. After the coup, the new 
military rulers of the country institutionalized the army’s presence in Turkey’s political life by 
creating the National Security Council, chaired by the president and minister of defense. These 
institutions yielded much influenced as they functioned as a parallel executive. 
The next time the military intervened in politics was on March 12, 1971 through what is 
described as a “coup by memorandum.” Under growing economic instability as well as declines 
in law and order, the military issued a three-point memorandum over the airwaves by Chief of 
General Staff Mamduh Tagmac and the commanders of the air, land and sea forces. The 
memorandum called for the government to take immediate steps to resolve the deepening 
economic crisis, high inflation and loss of security. It demanded a new government be put in 
place that would carry out Kemalist principles and implement reforms to institutionalize the 
secular values of Ataturk. If the government did not take these steps, the memorandum warned, 
the military would intervene to  carry out these steps and rule directly “under the laws that place 
the military in the role of protector of the nation (Birand, 1987).” 
The coup that occurred in 1980 was a consequence of unfinished business of the 
1971 memorandum. This coup was a result of the military viewing rightist and leftist groups, but 
especially the latter, as a severe threat to the state’s ideology and stability. Scholars have often 
noted the 1980 coup as Turkey’s most seminal coup as it was the last of Turkey’s classic coup 
d'etats, though it certainly was not the last of the military’s intervention or meddling in civilian 
life and politics. The 1971 intervention was seen as a “half-coup” concerned with the “re-
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equilibration of democracy” ( zbudun, 2000, p. 25). The generals did not suspend the 
constitution, dissolve the national assembly, or ban political parties in this case. Rather, the 
military formed a highly technocratic government to deal with the issues it felt the current 
government could not address, asserting its control more subtly through backdoor deals in 
politics.   
 Meanwhile, scholars have distinguished between the 1960 and 1980 coups in their 
motivations and impact. The 1960 coup was carried out by middle-ranking officers with serious 
differences among them, while the 1980 coup was led by the top level chain of the command of 
the armed forces, driven and operating by strict discipline and apparent consensus, who later 
became known as the National Security Council, composed of the commanders of the army, the 
navy, the air force, and the gendarmerie ( zbudun, 2000, p. 25). Furthermore, while the NSC of 
the 1980 coup outlawed all existing political parties and only allowed three new parties to 
contest elections, the National Unity Committee (NUC) military body collaborated with a 
previous opposition party, the Republican Peoples’ Party, and rallied for its victory. Finally, 
while the NUC was viewed as carrying out a moderating coup because of its main goal of 
resolving the pressing constitutional crisis, the National Security Council (NSC) on the other 
hand had ambitious goals for implementing swift social, political and structural changes. It 
passed more than 600 laws on political parties, trade unions, professional organizations, NGOs, 
educational institutions, media outlets, local government bodies, the judiciary and more. Thus, 
the 1980 coup was much more radical and authoritarian in its reach.  
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TABLE FOR TURKEY 1983 
Explanatory Variable Indicator TURKEY 
1983 
Time Frame  Announcement of election date 15 months  
 
(1 year, 3 months) 
 
 
 
Time Frame  When first post-coup parliamentary 
elections are held 
38 months  
 
(3 years, 2 months) 
Degree of contestation & opposition 
integration 
 
(0 = least inclusive, 4 = most 
inclusive) 
0 = Only the ruling party can run 
1 = A finite amount can run but all 
prior parties cannot 
2 = All parties can run except for 
the prior main opposition   
3= All candidates can run but not 
through formal parties 
4 = All parties are included and can 
run 
 
 
1 
 
 
Degree of military interference 
 
(0 = least interfering, 5 = most 
interfering) 
0 = no interference  
1 = the military may be interfering 
behind the scenes through talks with 
leaders or ambiguous speech; 
military interfering in general terms  
2 = military presence in election 
spaces; the ones observing 
elections; bar international 
monitors; is clearly influencing 
voting patterns; the military is poll 
rigging  
3 = the military is funding specific 
parties; backing candidates and 
parties and urging public to vote for 
them through speeches, advertising 
campaigns, etc.; the military is only 
allowing parties it deems fit to run 
4 = coup leaders and many 
members of the military (or retired 
generals) are contesting elections 
directly 
5 = military leaders stage a coup 
3 
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES TABLE FOR TURKEY 1983 
Outcome Variable Indicator TURKEY 
Legitimacy of Election Voter turnout 92.3% 
Legitimacy of Election Is there reported organized 
violence? 
No 
Change in Political 
Liberalization 
Does political liberalization 
regain pre-coup levels 
(immediately after by 1 year, 
and then 5 years) 
 
 
No 
 
(2, 3, F) → (5,5, PF) → (3,5, 
PF) → (2,4, PF) = Net 
Change = (0, +1) 
 
Decreased by  (0,1) 
 
 
Acceptance of Electoral 
Results 
Are elected leaders able to take 
office and complete their term 
(e.g. does the incumbent 
recognize them?)  
Yes 
Subsequent elections Do next scheduled elections 
occur as scheduled? 
Yes 
 
INDEPENDENT/EXPLANATORY VARIABLES (X)  
 
Time Frame 1: Calling for Elections 
On September 12, 1980, Turkish military leaders executed a coup d'etat known as 
Operation Fair Play. Upon seizing power, in a televised address to the public, General Kenan 
Evren mentioned no timetable for when elections would be held. Rather, he discussed that the 
new constitution would be the first step in regaining stability and this constitution would alter the 
election procedures and party laws that, “paved the way to today’s conditions,” he said (Kifner, 
1980). In subsequent speeches, Evren made references to elections but still did not offer a 
specific timetable for the military to return to the barracks. Three months later, on December 19, 
1980, he spoke of the timetable vaguely, “It is in our heads. I will disclose it in 1981. We carried 
Khalil 32 
 
out the military intervention on time, and we will implement our plan to return to democracy also 
on time” (Kifner, 1980). Within months, rumors leaked to the press about when the 
parliamentary elections would be held, some stating that a parliament would be formed as early 
as March 1981 according to the interim government (Kifner, 1980). International newspapers 
repeatedly came out with headlines like “Turk Rejects ‘Foreign Pressures’ To Hasten Return to 
Democracy” (New York Times, 1980) and “Turkish Junta Plans Changes Far Wider Than Initial 
Aims” (Howe, 1981). Such headlines reflect an aura of impatience with the junta outside of 
Turkey over whether Evren and his allies were truly committed to relinquishing power. On 
October 16, 1980, the junta named a 160-member “advisory assembly” tasked with drafting the 
country’s next constitution that would stipulate laws for the upcoming national parliamentary 
elections. A month later, impatience with the junta was vocalized by the constituent assembly, 
who called for more freedoms in their work with one member directly challenging the generals 
by demanding that the assembly have the right to institute “an agenda” and timetable for free 
elections (New York Times, 1981). It was finally a month later, on December 31st 1981, when 
Evren revealed the timetable and announced that elections would be held in the fall of 1983 at 
the soonest and spring of 1984 at the latest (Howe, 1981).  It took the coup leaders 15 months 
before they specifically declared when elections would be held. 
Time Frame 2: Holding Elections 
The first general post-coup elections were held in Turkey on November 7, 1983--27 months after 
the 1980 coup. They were held on time according to the date set and announced by General 
Evren two years earlier as the sooner date in the estimated timeframe (Howe, 1983, November 
7). 
Degree of Contestation 
 
Following the 1980 coup, all political parties were disbanded and Prime Minister 
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Suleyman Demirel and former prime minister Bulent Ecevit, the leaders of two prominent 
parties, the far right National Action Party and the social democrat Republican People’s Party (in 
coalition with the Islamist National Salvation Party) were put on trial, while thousands of local 
party leaders and 240 politicians were banned from political activity for 10 years (Howe, 1983, 
August 28). The generals later repealed their comprehensive ban on political parties in 1983 but 
kept harsh restrictions on who could contest the upcoming elections. As a result, only three new 
parties were allowed to run in the 1983 elections--ANAP (the Motherland Party, HP2 (Populist 
Party) and MDP (Nationalist Democracy Party) all parties that were not key players in the pre-
coup political landscape and had not run in the last national election in 1977. The popular parties 
that had won in this election--namely, the CHP (the Republican People’s Party) CHP and (the 
Justice Party (AP), were now banned from the 1983 elections). These parties lacked appeal for 
the most part, and the military wanted this. In fact, any party that sought to emerge as a 
charismatic, unique alternative, was quelled by the NSC by vetoing any founding members of the 
party right before the deadline the party founding members lists was due so that there was a 
shortage of the 30 needed names and the party could not run (Ahmed, 2000).  Some opposition 
parties tried to regroup under different and new party names, but laws that specifically excluded 
candidates of the previous government were put in place to bar them too (Feldmann, 1983).  
While political exclusion laws were able to bar visible politicians from running, mostly 
those who had served in the National Assembly or government before the coup, other opposition 
parties (RPP and JP) called for an election boycott, but they did not gain much sympathy from 
the electorate (Ahmed, 2000) General Evren shamed the boycotters in a public speech, saying, 
“...even those who say ‘I am a nationalist’ are, like the communists, saying don’t vote” (Ahmed, 
2000). 
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Besides completely and formally excluding the opposition, the generals only allowed 
contestation for new parties they deemed not threatening or related to previous parties. These 
new parties were allowed to form just a few months before the elections started on April 25, 
1983 (seven months before the elections).  
The generals kept the number of parties allowed to contest elections so small because 
they wanted one strong party to assert control over parliament rather than a return to the sort of 
coalition politics and party system fragmentation that dominated the pre-coup era, as Evren 
remarked, “Whatever we suffered, we suffered during the period of coalitions. Let (the parties) 
come together; we do not want another period of coalitions” (Ahmed, 2000). Scholars have noted 
that the military’s intentions behind this anti-coalition rhetoric was to produce strong one-party 
rule with incompetent and weakened opposition parties so the the September 12, 1980 regime 
could continue its regime with “all the trappings of parliamentary government” (Ahmed, 2000). 
The generals aimed to create a wider political class and eliminate all extremes and variation 
within it by excluding ideological minor parties (Türsan, 2004). The one-party government the 
generals envisioned would stunt the growth and power of all other groups. This is what the 1983 
parliamentary law sought to codify by requiring political parties to possess 10% of the vote 
nationally if they wanted to compete. Thus, the general sought not only to disallow parties of the 
old guard, but also new parties that lacked the organizational strength needed to gain the support 
of large segments of the population in the short period of campaigning (Hazama). Even then, 
their allowance to participate was contingent on certain candidates being excluded from running 
with their party ticket, with the military rejecting some of the nominations on their candidate list 
(Nohlen, 2001).  
Given the complete exclusion of all prior political parties as well as the heavy restrictions 
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for new parties to compete, the 1983 Turkish parliamentary election receives a 1 on the scale of 
0-4 for degree of contestation and opposition integration.  
Degree of Military Interference 
The Turkish military played an important role in organizing and executing elections 
following the coup. Their interference in the electoral process--from setting the timetable to 
directly influencing voting patterns through public speeches and campaigns to setting severe 
restrictions on nominations--highlight how the military oversaw and managed this process. Any 
party that wished to run needed a stamp of approval from the NSC and could be rejected without 
reason. For this reason, it took four months before any party was approved by the NSC and three 
parties were qualified to run (while 14 were denied) (Ahmad, 1984). The parties that did make 
the cut had their lists of candidates closely scrutinized and challenged by the NSC.  
Besides interfering in elections by selecting who could contest elections, the Turkish 
military actively championed one of the three parties it allowed to run. It threw its entire weight 
behind the MDP a few months before the elections because it saw it as the only party that could 
“guarantee continuity” to the September 12 regime’s ideology (Ahmed, 1984). The party was led 
by Turgut Sunalp, a retired general. By the time the party lists had been scrutinized and the final 
roster approved by the NSC, the parties only had three weeks to campaign, which marked the 
shortest campaigning period in the country’s political chronology” (Ahmad, 1984). During this 
time period, however, not much could be publicly discussed as the military dictated what issues 
could be discussed on air. The parties could not challenge or comment on the September 12 
regime and were not allowed to critique it in anyway. At least on the surface, the parties 
appeared similar in this regard as they all publicly vowed to uphold the “September 12 
philosophy” (Ahmad, 1984). 
Evren used his oratorical skills and charisma to campaign for the representatives he 
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thought best reflected the post-September 12 order. In a speech in Malatya on November 11, 
1982, shortly after the ban on all political activity had been lifted but still before the final party 
roster for contesting elections had been publicized, he warned people to choose the right party,  
There will be a period of elections before us. You will choose your new representatives in 
this election. I advise you to be very careful when you elect these new representatives. The old 
ones are up to their underhanded tricks. We know this, and you ought to know it too. If there had 
been virtue in old things, flea markets would have been bathed in glory. Find new personalities. 
Find new representatives. I have told you on a number of occasions what kind of qualities they 
ought to possess. Find these people from among yourselves, elect them and send them. We, too, 
will withdraw into a corner when the time comes. No one is indispensable in this world. 
Everyone ought to know how to withdraw to one side after having done his duty. If he doesn’t 
know, then those who will drive him out by force [i.e. the armed forces] might come forward. I 
urge you to be wide awake on this matter. (Ahmad, 1984) 
 
 In this warning, Evren pressures the public to vote for a new party and forget about the 
parties of the pre-coup era. With growing skepticism about the military’s intentions in politics 
and its stated return to the barracks, he confirms that the military wants to withdraw; it is only 
looking over this process for the good of the public and until the government is in trustworthy 
hands. Alongside this paternalistic advice is also a bold and clear threat: if the people do not 
choose the right party, the military will once again intervene.  
Just days before the election when it appeared that Ozal’s Motherland Party was ahead in 
public opinion polls and not the military’s favorited MDP, the military actually banned domestic 
public opinion polls in order to curb their influence on the election’s turn out (Howe, 1983, 
November 3). It was also during this time that General Evren came out in public support of the 
MDP and Sunalp, which he had previously been vaguer about when he had tried to play neutral 
with the rest of the junta. He launched a smear campaign against Turgut Ozal, discussing on 
television and radio stations just days before the election how irresponsible he was and that only 
the MDP could ensure an extension of the NSC’s policies, remarking, “If you are happy with the 
activities of the NSC over these three years, I am convinced that you will bring to power an 
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administration which will continue the Council’s policies and will not again push the country 
into confusion (Ahmad, 1984).” In addition to his words, interim Prime Minister Ulusu also 
made a public statement on national broadcast where he reminded people of the pre-coup 
situation flared with violence and incompetence and asked people to remember this as they voted 
the next day.  
Given the military’s unambiguous support for a certain party and its public campaign to 
urge electors to vote for the MDP, Turkey receives a 3 for the Degree of Military Interference in 
elections.  
OUTCOME VARIABLES  
Legitimacy of Elections 1: Voter Turnout 
The first post-coup national elections in November 1983 boasted a high voter turnout of 
92.3% (Nohlen, 2001). Different factors may have played a role in producing this high turnout. 
For one, many viewed this election as another referendum for the regime of September 12 (the 
first one being the actual constitutional referendum that put Evren in power in 1982). Other 
factors at play may include that voting was made compulsory in 1982, and a law mandated a fee 
on those who did not vote and did so with unjustified reason (although this law was known it was 
not really implemented) (Nohlen, 2001). Furthermore, those who did not register to vote for the 
1982 referendum lost the right to vote for the next five years, so they could not vote in the 
national elections in 1983 (Nohlen).   
Legitimacy of Elections 2: Electoral Violence 
While local and international journalist outlets have documented and written about the 
widespread violence that shook the country before the coup, this violence seems to have been 
greatly reduced in the post-coup period perhaps due to the mass arrests and heavy security order 
and police expansion. Looking through historical archives of newspapers (using LexisNexis and 
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ProQuest) of the time period, both local and foreign, there are no mentions of reported instances 
of violence in the election or days leading up to it. The Boston Globe, noted that there was “...a 
radical decline in political violence” after the coup and hints at a restoration of public order even 
amid a widening security crackdown on dissident voices and political and civil rights (Gilbert, 
1983). 
Change in Political Liberalization  
Based on year-to-year changes in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World reports on 
civil liberties and political rights, Turkey witnessed an increase in political liberalization 
following the election of 1983, though it did not regain pre-coup levels by the first post-coup 
election or even five years after it. In February 1979, before the September 12, 1980 coup, its 
scores were: 2 (political rights) and 3 (civil liberties) with a Freedom Rating designation as Free 
(2,3, F).  Just a year later, in 1981, after the coup, its scores were: 5 (political rights) and 5 (civil 
liberties) with a Freedom Rating designation as Partly Free (5,5, PF). Things began to shift back 
in 1983-1984 soon after the first post-coup election in November 1983. Its score became: 3 
(political rights) and 5 (civil liberties) with a Freedom Rating designation as Partly Free (3, 5, 
PF). This fluctuated little over the next five years until 1988 when its scores were: 2 (political 
rights) and 4 (civil rights) with a Freedom Rating of Partly Free (2, 4, PF). Although it did not 
reach its pre-coup status and Freedom Rating of “Free” it was able to lower its score over time 
close to pre-coup levels (Freedom House, 2014). 
(2, 3, F) → (5,5, PF) → (3,5, PF) → (2,4, PF) = Net Change = (0, +1) 
(Before the coup, right after the coup, right after the first post-coup election, five years after the 
first post-coup election)  
Thus, political liberalization did increase from the immediate post-coup time period to the first 
post-coup election time period but did not regain pre-coup elections  by the first post-coup 
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election (3 years after the coup) or five years after it. 
Aside from using Freedom House scores to determine the atmosphere for political and 
civil rights, comparing newspaper articles from the time before the coup, after the coup, and after 
the elections also help provide details on freedoms and repressions. Local and international 
newspapers documenting the period before elections highlight the extent the trials, executions, 
arrests, and crackdown of dissident journalists; the purging schools and universities of faculty 
deemed threatening to the September 12 regime and replacement with former generals; and the 
disbanding of student organizations and women’s wing of social and activist groups (Howe, 
1983, April 3). 
Acceptance of Electoral Results 
 
Despite heavy campaigning against Ozal’s center-right ANAP and for the 
ultraconservative Sunalp of the MDP, voters refused to vote in high numbers for the military-
backed NDP on election day. The MDP came in last out of the three running parties, with 23.3% 
of the vote compared with the liberal HP who received 30.5% of the vote and the center-right 
nationalist ANAP (Motherland Party) that came in at first with 45.1% (Nohlen, 2001). Because 
of the lackluster options in front of them, voters may have based their decision on whom they did 
not want to win rather on whom they vehemently supported. As one scholar notes, “...one may 
conclude that the voters regarded the election as a referendum on the regime of September 12; 
they were more concerned to express their disapproval of the government (thought not of the 
restoration of public order) than to judge the character of the alternatives offer to them” (Ahmed, 
2000). It was in the president’s power to disqualify the winner and call for new elections before 
the date parliament is supposed to first convene in a month (Anil, 1983). Indeed, many worried 
that this would happen, urging the new elected officials to not antagonize the generals in any 
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way lest they be encouraged to intervene directly once more. Nevertheless, the military accepted 
the results and recognized ANAP’s victory. President Evren soon made a public statement 
calling on the public to accept the results of the election.  
Subsequent Elections  
Perhaps one silverlining the generals looked to is that there still awaited local elections 
for it to also try to manipulate. This may explain why Ozal called for local elections so soon--he 
worried about the growing appeal of other parties, not so much the MDP after its noticeable 
defeat, but of the previously banned parties that were now allowed to contest elections because 
of a lifted ban; namely, Demirel’s Truth Path Party and Inonu’s Social Democracy Party 
(SODEP). Indeed, when local elections were held less than a year later in March 1984 to elect 
mayors and local parliaments, Ozal’s ANAP won a majority. What is interesting to note is that 
the HP2 and MDP were practically wiped out in these municipal elections, just five months after 
they had won sizeable sectors of the electorate. They merged or dissolved their parties after these 
elections.  
The elected officials were able to complete their term despite heavy scrutiny from the 
generals. Elections were held as scheduled in 1987 but this time with much less of the vote than 
it had previously collected. Fewer restrictions on the nomination process as well as the expiration 
of political exclusion laws (as voted by people in an earlier referendum to not renew it) opened 
up the elections for more parties to compete and a higher degree of contestation. ANAP came 
first once more followed by the Socialist Democratic Populist Party (a combination of SODEP 
and HP2) and then the True Path Party (of Demirel).  
 
 
 
 
Khalil 41 
 
DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS 
 
The 1983 election paved the way for stable and more competitive elections in Turkey and 
helped tame the military while asserting civilian challenge, if not power, over it. The military has 
sought to intervene a number of times after the 1980 coup, but greater self-restraint as well as 
legitimacy of elected officials kept it from ever carrying out another full fledged coup (although 
smaller interventions did happen).  
The 1983 elections should not be viewed as the restoration of democracy of multi-party 
politics. Strict interference by the military challenged the agency of people in choosing their next 
leaders. All previous parties were banned from running and the new parties could not include 
members of the old guard, or party names similar to previous ones. The NSC’s strong internal 
cohesion helped it maintain an image of authority and competency where there seemed to always 
be consensus among the five generals, and their power strongly remained intact in the post-coup 
era as other political bodies shifted, dissolved, recoiled and negotiated. The parties permitted to 
run by the NSC had all been established by loyal servants of the military administration who had 
actually worked together in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat (Birand, 1987). So even if there 
were options to choose from or it seemed like the people could choose between supporting a 
continuation of the September 12 regime (by voting NDP) or not (by voting ANAP or HP2), they 
all had some commitment to the NSC, even if they tried to portray otherwise (as Ozal tried to do 
by deliberately distancing himself as much as possible from the NSC). Further, martial law was 
reinstated and extended immediately after the election for another year, supposedly due to 
security and terrorist threats. The generals made it clear that even though there was a new 
civilian government in place, they were still the ultimate arbiters of politics and threatened 
intervention should the political parties not please them (Ahmed, 2000).   
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While it did not immediately produce the restoration or consolidation of democracy, 
some scholars have described the 1983 elections as the start of a “soft landing towards 
democracy” (Birand, 1987). While no single factor can be responsible on its own for the 
outcome of the elections as well as the implications the elections spelled out for the country’s 
democratic prospects, the timing and degree of inclusion of opposition parties stand out as 
particularly important variables in this case. Even though few parties were allowed to run, it is 
worth noting that the opposition was entirely excluded rather than selectively targeting or 
banning only one of the prior primary parties. For example, Ecevit, Demirel, Turkes and Erbakan 
were all taken into custody and were all banned from any political activity (T rsan, 2004). 
Erbakan was jailed while Turkes was sentenced with the death penalty along with 220 members 
of his party in the NAP. The leaders of all major parties were arrested, including the left of centre 
DISK and right wing MISK, while the leader of the Worker’s Party was stripped of her 
nationality (T rsan, 2004).  
The military leaders sought to purge the system of all previous parties. In its first coup 
communique, it blamed the country’s multiple parties and pinned responsibility for the 
intervention on all them, though it did emphasize that the “defender of the rule of the law” 
carried more of the blame for not being proactive in ending the internal strife (T rsan, 2004). By 
penalizing all political groups, the military regime had pressed a reset button that somewhat 
started over and opened a new chapter for competitive politics, albeit restricted and manipulated. 
Although the 1983 elections were not at all inclusive of the prior opposition and therefore not as 
contestable, this total exclusion rather than selective exclusion worked in favor of the country’s 
long-term democratic transition by defusing polarization and holding all parties accountable. 
Once the repeal of the political parties ban occurred in 1987 all parties were able to participate 
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once again and did not feel like they had to compensate for lost time since all parties had 
suffered the same consequence. The timing of the election, therefore, is also an important factor 
as gradually introducing elections, and even gradually including the opposition, gave time for the 
political parties that were highly scattered and arbitrary to standardize through ambitious reforms 
and policies the military regime introduced. For example, the 1983 Political Parties Laws 
imposed a standard organizational model for all parties to follow that outlined a particular system 
and timeline for all parties to follow ( zbudun, 2000). Doing this allowed the parties time 
discipline, re-evaluate and repair themselves internally, setting new policies for the election of 
their party congresses and executive committees and the national and local levels, as well as re-
distributing the centralizing party power. The new models that emerged out of this post-coup 
time period produced party policies and vision that more greatly aligned with democratic 
principles. Thus delaying elections allowed parties to focus on reforming themselves (even if 
they were banned) rather than preoccupying themselves over campaigning and other political 
issues in the public sphere. 
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CASE STUDY 2: PAKISTAN 1985 
We next move to study Pakistan, which was part of the third wave of democratization, 
and like Turkey, has been characterized as having effective periods of democratic rule 
interrupted by intermittent military interventions.  In 1973, Pakistanis voted on a Constitution 
that was passed and put into law. Among its many changes and stipulations, it outlined that the 
ruling government of the National Assembly that was elected in 1970 and took office in 1972 
should have their term reset and have their five year tenure begin on the date of the passing of 
the 1973 Constitution. This would make the next national elections occur on August 14, 1977 
rather than 1975. The opposition to Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People’s 
Party Party called for sooner elections, yet the incumbent refused. Under immense pressure, 
finally on January 1977, Bhutto dissolved both the national and provincial governments and 
called for early elections in March.  
The opposition mobilized quickly and formed a coalition called the Pakistan National 
Alliance. It was a populist coalition composed of nine conservative and Islamic right-wing 
parties: Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI), Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Jamiatul Ulema-e-Islam Mufti (JUI), Jamiat-
e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), Pakistan Muslim League Pagara Group (PML-Pagara), National 
Democratic Party (NDP), Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), Khaksar Tehrik (KT), and Azad 
Kashmir Muslim Conference (AKMC) (First 10 General Elections of Pakistan, 2013). 
These parties had different stakes and could offer different leverage, but they all detested 
Bhutto’s government and were connected by a desire to replace his rule. They were disillusioned 
by the Bhutto government’s nationalization of industries and private educational institutions 
(First Ten General Elections of Pakistan, 2013), and called for a more Islamic approach to the 
political and economic systems. They disapproved of what they saw as Bhutto’s corrupt and 
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increasingly authoritarian positions, especially toward the Islamic right-wing media outlets (First 
10 General Elections of Pakistan, 2013). However, the PPP was optimistic and determined to 
keep its power, emphasizing in its campaigns its widespread land reforms and assertive foreign 
policy toward India.  
On the day of the national elections, on March 7, 1977, the PPP won the overwhelming 
majority of parliament with 151 votes, while the PNA received only 36 (Nohlen, 2001). The 
PNA immediately rejected the results and accused the incumbent of rigging as most had 
predicted this would be a very close race. They immediately organized mass protests, calling for 
a re-vote for the national elections and a boycott for the provincial elections scheduled for just 
three days later.  The PPP initially used excessive force of the security apparatus along with 
martial law to try to quell street dissent. On June 15, under more intense pressure, Bhutto’s 
government agreed to negotiations with the PNA and soon after decided that it would organize 
new elections together with the PNA. They agreed that middle-ranking members of their groups 
would work out the details of the new election timeline and negotiate this agreement. Yet even 
while in negotiations with the ruling party, PNA supporters kept a street presence to apply 
pressure on the PPP and make sure it honored its end of the agreement. By then, some in the 
PNA were too disillusioned and felt like they could not trust the PPP after the last elections. For 
this reason, they advocated that the military needed step in to move forward this process (First 10 
General Elections of Pakistan, 2013).  
On July 5, 1977, General Zia ul Haq had lost his patience. He suspended the 1973 
Constitution, imposed martial law, removed the government, and became the de facto head of 
government. He announced that elections would be held within 90 days. Many members of the 
PNA and opposition to Bhutto celebrated this news. Zia put Bhutto on trial, convicting him of 
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murder, and he was hanged on April 4, 1979 (Nohlen, 2001). 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TABLE FOR PAKISTAN 1985 
Explanatory Variable Indicator PAKISTAN 1985 
Time Frame  Announcement of elections date 73 months  
(6 years, 1 month) 
Time Frame  When first post-coup parliamentary 
elections are held 
92 months 
(7 years, 7 months) 
Degree of contestation & opposition 
integration 
 
(0 = least inclusive, 4 = most 
inclusive) 
0 = Only the ruling party can run 
1 = A finite amount can run but all 
prior parties cannot 
2 = All parties can run except for 
the prior main opposition   
3= All candidates can run but not 
through formal parties 
4 = All parties are included and can 
run 
3 
 
 
Degree of military interference 
 
(0 = least interfering, 5 = most 
interfering) 
0 = no interference  
1 = the military may be interfering 
behind the scenes through talks with 
leaders or ambiguous speech; 
military interfering in general terms  
2 = military presence in election 
spaces; the ones observing 
elections; bar international 
monitors; is clearly influencing 
voting patterns; the military is poll 
rigging  
3 = the military is funding specific 
parties; backing candidates and 
parties and urging public to vote for 
them through speeches, advertising 
campaigns, etc.; the military is only 
allowing parties it deems fit to run 
4 = coup leaders and many 
members of the military (or retired 
generals) are contesting elections 
directly 
5 = military leaders stage a coup 
4 
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES TABLE FOR PAKISTAN 1985 
Outcome Variable Indicator PAKISTAN 1985 
Legitimacy of Election Voter turnout  53.7% 
Legitimacy of Election Is there reported organized 
violence? 
Yes 
Change in Political Liberalization Does political liberalization regain 
pre-coup levels (immediately after 
by 1 year, and then 5 years) 
 
 
Yes  
 
(4,5) → (6, 4) → (4,5) → (4,4) = 
Net Change = (0, -1) 
 
 
Increased by (0, 1) 
Acceptance of Electoral Results Are elected leaders able to take 
office and complete their term (e.g. 
does the incumbent recognize 
them?)  
Yes 
Subsequent elections Do next scheduled elections occur 
as scheduled? 
Yes 
 
Time Frame 1: Calling for Elections 
On July 7, 1977, Zia ul Haq staged a military coup where he suspended the constitution 
and announced that elections would be held within 90 days. This was not possible since he 
banned all legislative organs for four years. After the Supreme Court approved the execution of 
Bhutto, Zia ul Haq issued a new date for the general elections to take place during the fall of 
1979. When the results of local bodies’ elections in September 1979 showed that candidates with 
previous political affiliations were getting elected even though the election only allowed for 
independents, the military was unsettled by this and decided to postpone  the elections due to 
“unfavorable” circumstances (The First 10 Generals of Pakistan, 2013). On August 12, 1983, 
while addressing the Federal Council, Zia ul Haq announced that elections were to be held by 
March 23, 1985 and that the new National Assembly would take the place of the one dissolved 
during the 1977 coup.  It took the military general 73 months, or roughly six years and one 
month before announcing the election timetable.  
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Time Frame 2: Holding Elections  
Elections were held in Pakistan on February 25 and 28, 1985 for both the National 
Assembly and Provincial Assemblies. Though initially Zia ul Haq had said that they would 
happen within three months of the military coup, and then modified this multiple times to 
postpone its date, elections happened almost 92 months later, or roughly seven years and seven 
months (Nohlen, Asia). 
Degree of Contestation & Opposition Integration 
Whereas in Turkey the generals sought to break down coalitions and wanted weak or new 
parties to run, Zia ul Haq’s junta allowed no parties to run. All candidates running for the 
National Assembly could only run as independents. In this sense then, all political parties could 
technically be represented and included--just not formally. Left-leaning parties secretly formed a 
coalition in 1981 known as the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), which was 
led by the PPP and included eleven other parties. They rejected the ban on political parties in 
elections and called for an election boycott, describing the upcoming elections as not, “free, fair 
and impartial” (Tempest, 1985) and that running as independents as opposed to parties hurt them. 
They engaged in an anti-election campaign that sought to keep voter turnout under 10%, which 
Zia had hoped would be at at least 40%. Their actions were closely scrutinized and silenced, with 
the government breaking up any meetings they had, arresting their leaders and putting them on 
military trials (Tempest, 1985). 
In fact, by refusing to mobilize and put up unofficial candidates, they eased the way for 
the president to exclude them altogether. Real independents and members of parties who ran as 
independents were able to monopolize the vote and galvanize voters over personal and local 
issues palatable to the president and ruling junta (Silver, 1985). Zia ended up arresting many of 
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the leaders of the MRD for their subversive organizing against elections. 
The banning of political parties from running in elections resulted in an overwhelming 
number of political candidates where 1300 contested the National Assembly’s 207 seats. 
Basically, people who had money and had some social capital at the local level saw this as a 
unique opportunity to run and win (First Ten General Elections of Pakistan, 2013).  
The consequences of the military restricting the election’s themes and discourse had 
material consequences on political parties. Digressing national conversation away from socio-
economic and political issues and banning broad-based political alignments encouraged the 
conversation to instead shift towards identity politics where people were more concerned with 
their ethnic, religious, linguistic, and social alignments. Doing this strayed away from the 
political process and hurt parties that were already weakened by not being able to organize 
around their respective political platforms and activities (First Ten General Elections of Pakistan, 
2013).  
 Given that no parties were allowed to run but all candidates were allowed to run and that 
this indeed opened up opportunities for many people to contest the elections and for all parties to 
put up unofficial candidates, Pakistan is given a 3 on the continuum of 0-4 (where 0 is the least 
inclusive and 4 is the most inclusive) Banning parties from running hurt well-established parties, 
especially those that enjoyed broad recognition like the PPP and other parties in the MRD. 
However, this also opened the door for new players to compete and allowed all parties to put up 
unofficial candidates if they wanted to even if some parties and coalitions like the MRD chose 
not to participate.  
Degree of Military Interference  
As for military interference, Zia ul Haq shaped and meddled in the country’s first post-
coup elections heavily. In October 1984, he suggested that he may continue to be president after 
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the new government was elected into power, and he agreed to handover power at all only if the 
new elected representatives promised the Islamicization policies he introduced. In this way, he 
made clear that his intentions was to “share” power rather than “transfer” it (First Ten General 
Elections of Pakistan, 2013).  
From the time elections were announced, the campaigning period was tightly restricted 
and monitored by security forces. No public meetings, political rallies or demonstrations were 
allowed. Even election rhetoric was curtailed where candidates could not discuss issues related to 
national security, foreign policy or national domestic, political, and economic issues. Instead, 
candidates focused on local and personal issues to try to appeal to their voters, but that discourse 
obviously limited the scope of what issues voters could bring up (Silver, 1985). 
Unlike General Evren who wanted to shape Turkey into a one or two-party political 
system, General Zia in Pakistan wanted to wipe out nationwide political parties and broad-based 
coalitions and instead encourage and incentivize parties to orient themselves around ethnic, 
sectarian and geographic identities. To influence the outcome of elections, he banned discussion 
on what coalition and established political parties were used to in building their platform. He 
turned election themes and discourse into ones that focused on identity politics rather than 
political and economic issues (as was the case with the 1977 election campaigning). 
Besides interfering in elections through subtle and calculating approaches, the military 
interfered more directly by fielding its own candidates. Eleven members of Zia ul Haq’s cabinet 
ran in the National Assembly elections, including his defense minister Ali Ahmed Taipur. 
Surprisingly, these candidates did not do as well as expected; only six of them won (Tempest, 
1985). Many reporters and analysts read this as a symbol of no-confidence in Zia’s rule 
(Tempest, 1985). Besides those in his cabinet running for office, 85 members of the Majlis-e-
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Shoora, who served as an (unelected) advisory team to Zia ul Haq’s government, also contested 
elections.  
Legitimacy of Election: Voter Turnout 
The voter turnout for the National Assembly was placed at 53.7% according to official 
counts (Nohlen, 2001). There were 32,537,133 registered voters and 17,468,194 votes were cast. 
There were no compulsory voting laws in place. International news reporters documented voting 
as “generally fair and honest,” and contrasted it to the earlier presidential referendum that had 
much vote rigging and little voter supervision by neutral agents (Silver, 1985). 
The opposition, who called for a ballot boycott, challenged this number, saying it was too 
high based on their calculations. One of the few leaders of the MRD who was still free, Asghar 
Khan, said the numbers were too high, especially in urban areas where he claimed voting was 
only 5% to 15% (Tempest, 1985). 
A high voter turnout was extremely important to affirming Zia’s authority so he 
criminalized boycotting elections and waived requirements for voter IDs to make the process 
more accessible to all voters (Waseem, 1987).  
Given the direct and indirect ways the military government influenced and interfered in 
elections, especially by contesting notable its own notable figures, the Pakistan 1985 national 
election is given a 4 (on a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 = least interference, 5 = most interference) for 
the degree of military interference. 
Legitimacy of Election: Electoral Violence 
There were reports of organized electoral violence in the 1985 National Assembly 
elections, fueled by a heavy security presence of soldiers and police near election stations and in 
political hotspots that often came into contact with street demonstrations. The instances of 
reported violence are scattered and not consistently documented by rights groups or the 
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government. But news sources from this period of time highlight that this was indeed a problem. 
One international newspaper reported six people killed, 40 injured and 30 arrested in the 
northern Haripur constituency where the son of Ayub Khan was contesting a seat against Zia ul 
Haq’s minister of power (Silver, 1985). Another article a different paper reported, “There were 
several episodes of violence connected with Monday’s voting. Two men were killed in an 
election conflict at Sahiwal, in southern Punjab” (Silver, 1985). Media outlets also noted 
violence and chaos aggravated by supporters of the political opposition that caused damage to 
public property and led to many arrests (Tempest, 1985). Another account read, “A few hundred 
demonstrators gathered in Lahore to protest at the elections, from which General Zia had banned 
all parties. The police dispersed them with baton charges, arresting a batch of second-tier 
opposition leaders. Youths on scooters set four buses on fire” (Silver, 1985). The Times of India 
ran headlines on February 26 of, “3 killed in Pakistan poll violence,” (Times of India, 1985, 
February 26) and another later one, “Pressure against Zia’s move: 10 die in Pak poll violence 
(“Times of India, 1985, March 1).  
Change in Political Liberalization 
Shortly before the coup, in January and February of 1977, Freedom House rated 
Pakistan’s Political Rights at 4 and Civil Liberties at 5 (on a scale of 1-7, with 7 being the worst). 
In 1978, a few months after the coup, Pakistan’s Political Rights score was 6 and its Civil 
Liberties score was 4, with a freedom score of Partly Free (6, 4, PF). After the coup, there was a 
decrease in political rights, but a slight improvement in civil rights. After the first post-coup 
election, in 1985-1986, the scores for Political Rights were marked at 4 and Civil Liberties at 5 
with a Freedom Score of Partly Free (4, 5, PF). Five years later, in 1990, its score for Political 
Rights was 4, for Civil Liberties it was 4, and its Freedom Score was Partly Free (4,4, PF). Thus, 
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over this time period from the coup until the first post-coup election, civil rights stayed the same. 
After a worsening of Political Rights (by 2 points) and a slight improvement in Civil Liberties 
(by 1 point), Pakistan’s political liberalization regained pre-coup levels by the first post-coup 
elections in 1985. 
(4,5) → (6, 4) → (4,5) → (4,4) = Net Change = (0, -1) 
(Before the coup, right after the coup, right after the first post-coup election, five years after the 
first post-coup election)  
Acceptance of Electoral Results  
On April 10, 1985, the winning candidates and members of the new cabinet, led by Prime 
Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, were sworn into their new positions (Nohlen, 2001). The new 
assembly was characterized as conservative; from center to right-of-center to far right parties 
(Waseem, 1987). It was composed mostly of the feudal elite from Punjab, including some 
religious candidates and  industrial-commercial magnates (Waseem, 1987). The Pir of Pagara did 
well, winning almost ¼ of the Assembly and half of the Senate seats and half of the women’s 
seats (Waseem, 1987). In Baluchistan, mostly tribal chiefs and their families secured seats, as 
well as mine owner groups (Waseem, 1987). Islamist and Islamic groups did not do well in these 
elections. The JI won 10 seats out of 217 and the Swad-e-Azam was defeated, marginalizing 
groups that had advocated for implementing the Nizam-e-Mustafa during the campaigning 
season (Waseem, 1987).  
While the opposition and boycotting parties refused to see the new government’s triumph 
as legitimate or fair, the incumbent regime recognized the elected candidates and allowed them 
to be sworn into office.  
Subsequent Elections 
Bhutto had scheduled elections for the fall of 1988. He died suddenly and mysteriously in 
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a plane crash on August 17, 1988 but plans for these elections went through anyway, led by the 
Chairman of the Senate and the now acting president, Ishaq Khan. Although these elections went 
on as scheduled, the entering government of Benazir Bhutto could not complete its term as they 
were dismissed by President Ishaq Khan in 1990.  
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
 
Timing appears to be an important factor that stands out in Pakistan’s post-coup election. 
The election timing process was shaky both in announcement and practice. It took General Zia 
two or three false alarms before the actual date was announced for elections that then translated 
into material elections. The military government lost more of its credibility as it declared 
timetables for elections that kept changing and were not abided by. These national elections 
happened eight years after the coup. Although I hypothesized that there is merit in delaying 
elections and temporizing the timetable, I have argued that it should be delayed by 3-5 years and 
not indefinitely. In fact, scholars studying military coups have noted that military leaders need 
time in order to consolidate their power, as doing so allows them to build networks, 
institutionalize repressive mechanisms, and establish systems of patronage. In this sense, the 
coup leader grows more skillful over time and expands his power base (Bienen). Scholars have 
suggested that coup leaders are more vulnerable at the beginning of their incumbency and grow 
stronger and more secure over time. However, it is worth noting that in many contexts where the 
military already enjoys a strong and important role, including Pakistan, the leader does not 
always need time to establish himself and grow support as these leaders often already occupy an 
important role before the coup. In fact, in the role of Zia, extending his presidency did not work 
in his favor. Unlike when he enjoyed support from the PNA during 1977-1979, by the end of 
1985 after the post-coup national elections, he did not have this same support and people grew 
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tired of his imposed martial law (Waseem, 1987). Toward the end of his tenure, Zia could not 
postpone elections any further because of growing cynicism among the general population, 
including non-MRD parties and non-bureaucratic institutions which previously had supported or 
been apathetic to his rule (Waseem, 1987). In fact, the military government put off elections for 
so long because it sought to wait out the MRD. It assumed, as Waseem Muhammad notes, a 
“passive policy” where it waited for the MRD to dissolve and give up on its own. He feared 
reprisal from the opposition and worried about his own lack of legitimacy as more pressure 
(domestically and internationally) grew on him in 1983 and 1984 to begin a democratic 
transition. In trying to outwait the MRD, Zia also tried to gain support by negotiating and 
opening talks with other political players, mostly ones that were irrelevant and insignificant 
(Waseem, 1987).  
However, time is significant not only because it eroded support for military law, but also 
because it gave the opportunity for the main opposition movement, the MRD, to spread over the 
years. The coalition rallied against the one point that it thought the public could agree to: ending  
martial law. It was able to challenge this effectively using the time it had as a banned party to 
reach out and form alliances with group that were not naturally inclined to it but were growing 
weary of the military regime with time. The MRD succeeded in getting the regime to change 
martial law from “corrective” to “self-perpetuating” measures. Though a small and qualitative 
victory, it was nevertheless an important one that lent the party more visibility and legitimacy it 
needed, and eventually resulted in the lifting of martial law on December 1985  as well as the 
country’s state of emergency which had been in place for 20 years (Waseem, 1987).  Some of the 
opposition parties were also successful in that they were able to better organize over time. The 
MRD was initially viewed skeptically as an activist force that did not know how to translate its 
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democratic calls into concrete platforms. Voters were disillusioned with its constant vague calls 
for restoring democracy rather than focusing on issues of class exploitation or problems with 
India (Waseem, 1987). They were also missing the support of student and labor demonstrations, 
as the PNA had before the 1977 election. But over time, the MRD was able to come to consensus 
on a number of issues even though the groups and individuals within it differed ideologically. 
They all came to agree that the 1973 Constitution needed to be restored and that general elections 
should happen on a party basis. Their canvassing and goal planning were important electoral 
exercises that helped them build organizational strength for their political parties. Additionally, 
their unwillingness to negotiate with the regime would buy them later legitimacy once broader 
sectors of the public became disillusioned with military rule (Waseem, 1987). 
In comparison to Turkey’s 1983 post-coup election, where only three parties could run 
but none from the prior opposition, Pakistan’s 1985 election seemed to be more inclusive 
because theoretically everyone could run. It may seem  counterintuitive to consider a party-less 
election as more inclusive (when compared to Turkey that we just looked at and Algeria that we 
will soon turn to), but in essence, all parties had the option to run unofficially even though they 
were all banned formally. Voters in this party had a wider range of candidates to choose from, 
and the options they had represented a more diverse array of interests than Turkey’s 1983 post-
coup election.  
However, holding an independent-only election contributed to the de-institutionalization 
of Pakistani politics. It hurt electoral politics because candidates had to rely on individual 
resources for support (Waseem, 1987). National elections often already are dominated by people 
of privileged backgrounds; banning parties made it even harder for candidates to rely on 
themselves for mobility, networks, and financial support. Therefore, even though these elections 
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were rather inclusive to all candidates in terms of participation, it was only those candidates with 
economic, factional and financial support who could make it very far.  
Zia worried so much about his waning legitimacy that a higher voter turnout at the 1985 
national elections became his biggest goal. In fact, it even drove him to invite the MRD that he 
had initially sought to exclude to participate in the elections, even though no parties were 
allowed to run. He knew that a higher turnout depended on them participating even though he 
simultaneously viewed them as a threat to post-election politics. But the MRD, which was 
accustomed to boycotts since its existence and disapproved of Zia’s exiling of its PPP leaders, 
did not trust that the government would welcome their initiatives when many of their leaders had 
rallied against Bhutto for so long (Waseem, 1987). 
We see that time and contestation are related factors in Pakistan’s post-coup election. 
With time, the opposition movement grew more connected and the Zia government began to 
more closely monitor their activities. In fact, it started to base its own strategies on perceived 
threats of the MRD (Waseem, 1987). For example, when it heard that the MRD was calling for 
mass protests on August 14, 1983, it sought to prevent this by finally announcing a clearer 
election timetable just two days before this date.  
Zia’s banning of parties had serious implications not only of the political parties who 
were disadvantaged because of this policy, but also for the composition of the new assembly. 
Banning parties caused multiple candidates for a majority of seats, which meant that the winning 
candidates would actually only carry a small fraction of the registered and polled votes 
(Waseem, 1987). So it became less clear how representative or legitimate the victory of the 
candidate was. One scholar of the 1977 coup described the assembly that emerged out of the 
1985 elections as comprising, “The least ‘representative’ public representatives ever possible, at 
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least in terms of the direct public mandate each of them enjoyed” (Waseem, 1987). The authority 
and credibility of the incoming candidates, then, was questioned.  
Additionally, the partyless election hurt the new incoming government administratively 
and logistically. Prime Minister Junejo’s partyless government was disorganized and chaotic, in 
comparison to the organized MRD that was not formally challenging them in parliament but that 
increasingly had the public’s eye follow them. In this sense, the apolitical elections of 1985 kept 
the regime from solving the serious political crisis the country was immersed in. The enforced 
diversion from national issues kept the discourse centered on local issues like sanitation, roads 
and water--issues that should have been left to the local and provincial body elections (Waseem, 
1987). The focus of the elections were not ideological or national, but about consolidating 
power. General Zia sought to co-opt existing parties and local power holders rather than 
attempting to create his own constituency (Waseem, 1987).  
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CASE STUDY 3: ALGERIA 1997 
 
Finally, we turn to Algeria, whose extended period of colonization delayed its 
experimentation with democracy until the 1980s. After a  century of French colonial rule, 
Algeria gained its independence in 1962. The time period between 1962 to 1989 was marked by 
a single party system by the National Liberation Front (NLF) that had led the revolution against 
the French. This party became codified as the ruling regime in the 1963 and 1976 Constitutions 
(Nohlen, 1999). The real power always rested with the presidency, which became strongly linked 
to the army when Lieutenant Houari Boumedienne backed Ahmed Ben Bella’s installation as 
Algeria’s first president from 1962-1965. Boumedienne however, staged a coup to remove Bella 
and took over in 1965. The political landscape in Algeria during this time was characterized by 
autocracy and repression. In 1989, following the 1988 October Riots, the country experienced a 
political opening through a referendum where electors voted to stop the FLN’s monopoly in 
politics. The Party Act passed on July 5, 1989 and the Electoral Act passed on August 7, 1989 
paved the way for the first competitive elections in Algeria scheduled for 1991/1992.  
During this time, a new press flourished and the role of parliament was strengthened to 
balance the presidency. The military returned to its barracks and focused on issues of national 
defense. Many parties became legalized, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The party 
swept the first round of national elections on December 26, 1991, defeating the FLN that had 
dominated for so long. The FIS was poised to do well again in the second round when Algeria’s 
military generals disrupted the process and mounted a coup on January 11, 1992. They annulled 
the results, imposed martial law and ousted President Chadli Benjedid, who had held power since 
1979 and was the one who had begun the government’s transition to multiparty democracy. The 
new ruling junta installed the new High Committee of State whose leader, Mohamed Boudiaf, 
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became the interim president for a short period of time. Minister of Defense General Liamine 
Zeroual became the head of state in 1994. In the meantime, in the place of parliament was a 
Transitional Council composed of representatives of various political parties, civil society and 
public authorities chosen by the generals. The situation grew more polarized, violent and 
repressive across the country. 
In 1995, opposition groups including the FIS met in Italy for the “Rome Platform” which 
requested dialogue between the government and opposition (Khalaf, 1995). The government 
refused and instead held fraudulent elections in November 1995 where General Zeroual won in a 
landslide (though he did win support him because so many people craved a return to stability), 
which the opposition parties at the Rome Platform boycotted. A year later, a referendum on 
November 26, 1996 expanded the role of the president and created an upper chamber in the 
parliament appointed by the president that controlled parliamentary decisions (Nohlen, 1999). 
The elections of 1997 marked the first time for Algerians to vote in national 
parliamentary elections since the coup. The military leaders were highly concerned with 
legitimizing this process, especially in the eyes of the international world, particularly from the 
United States and France. They actively sought the presence of international observers and 
election monitoring groups and created their own as well, known as the National Independent 
Elections Observation Commission (CNISEL), which was a civilian body responsible for 
overseeing the entire election process. While many hoped that the elections would usher in a new 
chapter and end the instability and widespread violence that had claimed the lives of one hundred 
thousand people, others were more wary because of the tainted slate of the military. While some 
analysts and journalists at the time described the upcoming elections as a way for the 
government to “bury its failed democratic experience” from a few years before (Khalaf, 1997), 
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some opposition parties believed that there was merit in working within this system and that 
there was more reason to believe in the credibility of elections this time (as compared with the 
presidential election two years before). One leader of the opposition party, the secularist and 
Berber-oriented Rally for Culture and Democracy, noted that the military would not try to 
manipulate this election or hold onto full pare, “It (the military government) always aims for 
permanent hegemony. But we are living in very unstable times and rigging this election will 
simply aggravate the  divorce (Khalaf, 1997). 
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TABLE FOR ALGERIA 1997 
Explanatory Variable Indicator ALGERIA 
1997 
Time Frame  Announcement of election date 41 months 
(3 years, 5 months) 
Time Frame  When first post-coup parliamentary 
elections are held 
58 months 
(4 years, 10 months) 
Degree of contestation & opposition 
integration 
 
(0 = least inclusive, 4 = most 
inclusive) 
0 = Only the ruling party can run 
1 = A finite amount can run but all 
prior parties cannot 
2 = All parties can run except for 
the prior main opposition   
3= All candidates can run but not 
through formal parties 
4 = All parties are included and can 
run 
2 
 
 
 
 
Degree of military interference 
 
(0 = least interfering, 5 = most 
interfering) 
0 = no interference  
1 = the military may be interfering 
behind the scenes through talks with 
leaders or ambiguous speech; 
military interfering in general terms  
2 = military presence in election 
spaces; the ones observing 
elections; bar international 
monitors; is clearly influencing 
voting patterns; the military is poll 
rigging  
3 = the military is funding specific 
parties; backing candidates and 
parties and urging public to vote for 
them through speeches, advertising 
campaigns, etc.; the military is only 
allowing parties it deems fit to run 
4 = coup leaders and many 
members of the military are 
contesting elections directly 
5 = military leaders stage a coup 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES TABLE FOR ALGERIA 1977 
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Outcome Variable Indicator ALGERIA 1997 
Legitimacy of Election Voter turnout 65.6% 
Legitimacy of Election Is there reported organized 
violence? 
Yes 
Change in Political Liberalization Does political liberalization regain 
pre-coup levels (immediately after 
by 1 year, and then 5 years) 
 
 
No 
 
4,4 → 7,6 → 6,5 → 6,5 = Net 
Change = (+2, +1) 
 
Decreased by (2, 1) 
Acceptance of Electoral Results Are elected leaders able to take 
office and complete their term (e.g. 
does the incumbent recognize 
them?)  
Yes 
Subsequent elections Do next scheduled elections occur 
as scheduled? 
Yes 
 
Time Frame 1 
President Zeroual, who became the interim president on January 1994, called for 
elections on May 1996, four years after the coup. He announced that elections would occur in 
early 1997 after the adoption of new electoral laws. Announcement of the first post-coup 
parliamentary elections were made 41 months after the coup (3 years and 5 months). 
Time Frame 2  
The first parliamentary post-coup elections took place on October 23, 1997--four years 
and 10 months after the coup (58 months later).  
Degree of Contestation & Opposition Integration 
Rather than entirely ban parties from running in elections, the military government 
sought to vet candidates and allow the ones it did not view as too threatening to participate. In 
fact, the military wanted to include more parties in the election in order to drive up the voter 
turnout percentage (similar to Zia’s motivations of inviting the MRD), and consequently, the 
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legitimacy of the electoral process despite the exclusion and severe repression against the FIS. In 
this sense, the state had an incentive to allow voters some variety in selecting candidates and to 
respect their votes (Roberts, 2004).  
All told, 7,740 candidates from 39 parties along with 554 independents contested the 380 
seats (IPU, 1997). The FIS, AIG and Islamic Salvation Army called for boycotts of the election 
but the FIS was banned from running anyway, and the AIG and Islamic Salvation army were not 
considered political parties. In addition, the right-of-center Movement for Democracy in Algeria 
also boycotted the 1997 election, being one of the few legal political parties to do so. Its leaders 
believed in opening up negotiations with FIS and believed they should participate in elections if 
the country were to move forward and undergo a democratic transition. They also disapproved of 
the unstable and insecure conditions which they believed were not conducive for democratic 
elections (IPU, 1997). 
Legal provisions in the Political Party Law passed in March 1997 opened the way for 
formal exclusion of some parties. Article 5 of it states, “no political party may...found its 
establishment or its action on a religious, linguistic, racial, gender, corporate, or regionalist 
basis” (Algeria, 1997). But Islamic and Berber-centered parties did run, so the article was meant 
to ban parties with explicit sectarian associations in their name; that is, the FIS. Other parties 
who did have sectarian/ethnic oriented names changed them to follow the law (National 
Democratic Institute, 1997); for example, Hamas became known as  the Movement of Society 
for Peace or MSP (National Democratic Institute, 1997). Rights groups criticized these laws for 
violating the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that impeded full freedom of 
association for parties (Algeria, 1997).  
Overall, the elections appeared to have some “pluralist trimmings” or “formal pluralism” 
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but it really was a repetition of the pre-1990 elections where regime-backed parties dominated 
elections, except this time there were two options aligning with the military regime--the FLN and 
the RND (Roberts, 2004). Other non-regime-backed parties were able to contest elections as 
well. There were alternatives offered to the FIS in an attempt by the government to pacify 
Islamists and supporters of the FIS, so the MSP and An-Nahda were included, agreeing to quiet 
down any radical tendencies. Two Berber-centered/supportive parties--the Rally for Culture and 
Democracy (RCD) and the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) (Roberts, 2004) were also included in 
these elections.  
The elections were considerably competitive not only because of the parties represented 
but because of what they were saying. They were not all loyalists or supporters to President 
Zeroual and some of them challenged military rule openly. One member of the executive council 
of the Islamist Movement for a Peaceful Society noted, “Democracy means dialogue and 
conviction. Violence will not end with the elections; it will end gradually and when the sources 
and reasons for it stop. One of the requirements if the return of the army to the barracks” (Khalaf, 
1997). This sort of public ridicule and critique was not only characteristic of Islamist parties but 
of others including the Socialist Forces Front and the Workers’ Party who challenged the 
government’s inability to cultivate reconciliation and demanded accountability for its human 
rights abuses, including the assassinations of political figures. They went to so far as to threaten a 
“pacifist revolution” if elections were rigged (Khalaf, 1997). Such sentiments and public 
discourse show that dissent was common even in the repressive and violent circumstance of the 
post-coup period. The military regime could not silence discussion on pressing national issues as 
had been done in Pakistan’s post-coup period leading up the coup. One thing that was off-limits, 
however, was for public critics to describe the 1992 intervention as a coup d'etat (Khalaf, 1997). 
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Given the government’s selective inclusion yet relative opening in the electoral process 
as well as the persistence of some political parties to participate despite their skepticism and 
frustration with the process and the military regime, Algeria is given a 2 because the exclusion is 
primarily against the prior main opposition party--the FIS--and the process is otherwise relatively 
open (yet regulated and manipulated) for all others. 
Degree of Military Interference 
 
Rights groups have noted discrepancies between civilian voting and military voting in the 
1997 national election, which occurred on different days. Not only were these distinct votes, but 
they were marked hierarchically where military/security forces voting was referred to as 
“special” voting that happened before the civilian vote and occurred in the barracks (Algeria, 
1997). The locations and specifics of military voting were not transparent, and as a result, 
opposition and international watchdog observers were not able to monitor them the way they did 
for the civilian voting. Police and military voting turnout was near 100%--voting for them was 
compulsory which was not consistent with non-compulsory voting for civilian voters (National 
Democratic Institute, 1997). As NDI election observers noted, “...changes should be made to the 
election law and to the administration of the election law to ensure that military (special) and 
civilian voting are subject to the same rules and guarantees of openness” (National Democratic 
Institute, 1997).  
While all independent candidates and parties were allowed to have five representatives at 
the polling stations as observers for voting and counting the vote, international observers noted a 
heavy security presence with some armed guards inside polling stations, which often fostered an 
intimidating environment for voters. Furthermore, UN observers noted that the mobile voting 
booths, especially in rural parts of the countries, were too easily subject to fraud and were 
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dubious in securing neutrality (IPU, 1997).  
Reports by Human Rights Watch national election observers noted that the military 
regime “facilitated the rapid rise of the RND, formed only in February to mobilize support for 
the President and his government” (Algeria, 1997). Opposition parties were aware of the 
regime’s favoritism toward the RND; the party used the national emblem in its publicity 
materials despite violating electoral rules (Khalaf, 1997)  and had support from the government 
in organizing public rallies. Given that the military government visibly backed the RND through 
rhetoric and resources, and less so, the FLN, on the ranking system of 0-5 for military 
interference, the Algerian national election of 1997 is identified with a 3 for the degree of 
military interference. 
 Though there were international observers from various organizations and countries 
including the National Democratic Institute, Human Rights Watch, the Arab League and the 
Organization of African Unity, the hundreds of monitors who showed up could not possibly 
cover all or even most of the 35,000 polling stations across the country (Khalaf, 1997). 
Legitimacy of Election 1: Voter Turnout 
The voter turnout for the Algerian parliamentary election of 1997 was 65.6%. 10,999,139 
out of the 167,767,309 eligible voters cast their ballots in the June election. This number was 
within relative range of what the military government had aspired to, though voting was much 
lower in Algiers at 44% (Cohn, 1997). Voting was not compulsory. 
Legitimacy of Election 2: Electoral Violence  
There are conflicting reports about election day violence as told by government, 
opposition and international records. The National Institute for Democracy (NDI), which had 
sent 13 members to 11 different wilayas, noted in its Parliamentary Election report that, “In the 
polling stations visited by the NDI team, the atmosphere on election day was devoid of violence 
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and fear” (National Democratic Institute, 1997) and, “The NDI team was generally impressed by 
the peaceful and orderly conduct of the election and the professionalism of the polling 
officials…” (National Democratic Institute, 1997).   
Other national election monitoring groups, including a delegation of Human Rights 
Watch workers who visited from March 30 to April 13, 1997, noted that the “ongoing political 
violence and repression” was making it difficult for those Algerians who “wish to express their 
views or take part in political life.” The Human Rights Watch report noted the many political 
assassinations occurring that targeted activists across the political spectrum, especially five that 
occurred in the close run-up to the elections (Algeria, 1997).  
 Finally, a number of newspaper accounts from the time period paint a scenario of 
scattered attempts of violence, killings, and car bombs on election, sometimes resulting in great 
casualties (Star Tribune, 1997). Reports of casualties in the two days leading up to elections, 
whoever, were many (Star Tribune, 1997). 
Change in Political Liberalization  
Before the coup, in 1991, Freedom House assigned Algeria a score of 4 for Political 
Rights and 4 for Civil Liberties and its overall Freedom Score was Partly Free (4, 4, PF). In 
1992, right after the coup, Algeria had a score of 7 for Political Rights, and 6 for Civil Liberties, 
with a Freedom Score of Not Free (7, 6, NF). Shortly after the first post-coup election in 1998 
(one year after elections), Algeria had a rating of a 6 for Political Rights and 5 for Civil Liberties, 
with a Freedom Score of Not Free (6, 5, NF). Five years later in 2002, it held onto the same score 
of (6, 5, NF).  
The country improved its scores a bit after the first post-coup election and five years after 
the post-coup election (in 2002) when compared to the immediate aftermath of the coup, but it 
has not yet gained pre-coup scores: 
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 4,4 → 7,6 → 6,5 → 6,5 = Net Change = (+2, +1) 
(Before the coup, right after the coup, right after the first post-coup election, five years after the 
first post-coup election)  
Acceptance of Electoral Results 
The new government was created on June 26, 1997 where Prime Minister Ahmed 
Ouyahia formed his cabinet, mostly composed of the RND but also of some members of the 
Islamist MSP (with 69 seats) and government-supportive FLN (64), making this Algeria’s first 
multi-party legislature (Cohn, 1997). Though the opposition political parties doubted and 
contested the election results, they did not dismiss or boycott the new parliament. As the NDI 
election observers noted, As noted by NDI, “...the opposition political parties demonstrated long-
term commitment to a democratic political process by remaining in the electoral process and 
agreeing to take their seats in the newly elected parliament even in the face of a less than fair 
election process and despite lodging several major complaints...The results of the election, 
although marked by some serious irregularities, have been accepted by the parties which have 
assumed their new positions in parliament” (National Democratic Institute, 1997). 
Subsequent Elections 
The incumbent government was able to complete its term and the next election for the 
People’s National Assembly was held as planned in 2002.  
DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS 
The case of the post-coup election in Algeria is directly contingent on its politics and the 
conditions leading up to and surrounding the election.  Because of the civil war that ensued after 
the 1992 coup, this case is distinct from the others, and naming the primary factors that shape it 
is a difficult and audacious task. While I had hypothesized that it is the timing variable that is 
most impactful in spelling out the democratic prospects of a post-coup election, in the case of 
Algeria it is difficult to see how this is the case alone. Algeria introduced elections 
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approximately five years after its coup. This falls within the 3-5 timeframe I suggested is needed 
in order to gradually introduce electoral politics and allow time to defuse violence, political 
tensions and polarization as well as give time for parties to gain strength and re-organize to adapt 
to the post-coup order. In the case of Algeria, it is difficult to say that time defused violence, 
especially when some of the worst episodes of the war came shortly after the elections. But as I 
emphasize throughout this thesis, the first election cannot be seen as the end of a transition or the 
consolidation of democracy (Soudriette, 2007). It is one part of a painstaking process emerging 
from, especially in this case, a traumatic ordeal. It therefore is a cautious step in an attempt to 
move forward current political situations.  
Time did not solve Algeria’s election issues but gradually introducing elections did allow 
some of the opposition an opportunity to meet with one another and form a coalition, even 
though they once competed against one another. For example, it wasn’t until 1995, as opposition 
members collectively grew agitated by the military government and itched for national dialogue 
and inclusive elections did the opposition form the Rome Platform that included the FIS, FLN, 
FFS (Socialist Forces Front) and other parties where it organized a proposal to the military 
regime for ending the political crisis. Although the regime rejected their requests and called for 
presidential elections instead, this was an important opportunity for the opposition to reach 
consensus through political mobilization; it was a political exercise for how coalition politics 
could operate despite the escalating violence and polarization. 
In terms of military interference, although the process was designed and shaped by the 
military, election discourse was not as severely monitored and restricted as it was in Pakistan. 
Furthermore, although parties were screened and altered to meet the requirements of what the 
regime deemed acceptable and non-threatening, these changes were often superficial and done 
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for “official” reasons. Otherwise, it is clear from the words of various party leaders that not all 
those who were running trusted the system or were loyal to General Zeroual. Some of them ran 
precisely believing they could challenge the ruling party by engaging in subversive politics 
within the available system. Mouloud Hamrouch, former prime minister, former FLN party 
member and an independent candidate in the 1997 elections called on opposition parties to 
participate rather than boycott even if voting conditions were not ideal, “The Pouvoir may not 
have seen all the implications of its policy. It cannot always manipulate public opinion. It will 
have to cede something,” he continued to call on the opposition to participate in elections, saying 
that they had an option to, “Remain a naive primitive opposition, emphasizing only their own 
identity, or they can infiltrate the system from within, question the issues and highlight them 
before public opinion. The opposition will have a huge role to play, they could kill democracy or 
force it into existence (Khalaf, 1997).”  
This sentiment was common and felt among many in the opposition. It highlighted that 
despite the problematic aspects of the electoral process, candidates were willing to take a chance 
and run anyway, and that they did not view the process as entirely illegitimate. Large segments 
of the opposition believed that even if not a full or significant victory, having some 
representation in parliament could, as one journalist described it, “help the country move from a 
shooting war to a war of words” (Cohn, 1997). In addition, the presence of international election 
monitors and observers from various parties reified  that despite some irregularities and 
malpractice in voting, it was generally democratic and fair (Khalaf, 1997). 
Finally, the degree of contestation and opposition inclusion was a factor that hugely 
shaped Algeria’s post-election prospects for democracy.  In essence, the regime sought to have 
many parties compete so that the vote would be fragmented and no single opposition party or 
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broad-based coalition could win. It sought to play these parties against one another by 
multiplying them even when some parties’ platforms and orientations were similar. For example, 
the MSP tried to win the votes of the previous FIS vote since their ideologies were similar, yet 
the FIS dismissed them for collaborating with the government (Khalaf, 1997). Similarly, the 
RND courted the base of the FLN yet at the same time tried to distance itself from it and show 
that it was different from it since many Algerians blamed this former ruling party for the 
country’s social and economic issues (Khalaf, 1997). This “divide and conquer” strategy worked 
in favor of the military regime. This contrasts to the strategy used by the military regime in 
Turkey where they feared the fragmentation of politics because of the instability and deadlock it 
bred before the coup, and instead sought to have only a small handful of parties, none of whom 
were too hostile to the regime or were part of the prior political landscape, but also not all of 
whom were ardent supporters and loyalists to the regime. Essentially, excluding only one 
opposition party, and the one that had just been democratically-elected and overthrown in a coup 
before the electorate could even judge its performance, severely damaged the post-coup 
prospects for democracy. Rather than solve the country’s political issues that clearly included the 
FIS and its many supporters who had voted for it, the regime excluded it and tried to sweep the 
party under the rug and erase the coup from public memory. This would prove damaging and 
hard to heal in the long-term.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Khalil 73 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
SUMMARY TABLE OF THREE CASE STUDIES 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Indicator TURKEY 
1983 
PAKISTAN 
1985 
ALGERIA 
1997 
Time Frame  When post-coup 
election date first 
announced  
15 months  
 
 
(1 year, 3 
months) 
 
73 months  
 
 
(6 years, 1 
month) 
41 months 
 
 
(3 years, 5 
months) 
Time Frame  When first post-
coup 
parliamentary 
elections are 
held 
38 months  
 
(3 years, 2 
months) 
92 months 
 
(7 years, 7 
months) 
58 months 
 
(4 years, 10 
months) 
Degree of 
contestation & 
opposition 
integration 
 
(0 = least 
inclusive, 4 = 
most inclusive) 
0 = Only the 
ruling party can 
run 
1 = A finite 
amount can run 
but all prior 
parties cannot 
2 = All parties 
can run except 
for the prior 
main opposition   
3= All 
candidates can 
run but not 
through formal 
parties 
4 = All parties 
are included and 
can run 
 
 
1 
 
 
3 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Degree of 
military 
interference 
 
0 = no 
interference  
1 = the military 
may be 
3 4 3 
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(0 = least 
interfering, 5 = 
most interfering) 
interfering 
behind the 
scenes through 
talks with 
leaders or 
ambiguous 
speech; military 
interfering in 
general terms  
2 = military 
presence in 
election spaces; 
the ones 
observing 
elections; bar 
international 
monitors; is 
clearly 
influencing 
voting patterns; 
the military is 
poll rigging  
3 = the military 
is funding 
specific parties; 
backing 
candidates and 
parties and 
urging public to 
vote for them 
through 
speeches, 
advertising 
campaigns, etc.; 
the military is 
only allowing 
parties it deems 
fit to run 
4 = coup leaders 
and many 
members of the 
military (or 
retired generals) 
are contesting 
elections directly 
5 = military 
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leaders stage a 
coup 
 
Outcome 
Variable 
Indicator TURKEY PAKISTAN ALGERIA 
Legitimacy of 
Election 
Voter turnout 92.3%  53.7% 65.6% 
Legitimacy of 
Election 
Is there reported 
organized 
violence? 
No Yes Pending 
(conflicting 
reports)   
Change in 
Political 
Liberalization 
Does political 
liberalization 
regain pre-coup 
levels? 
(immediately 
after by 1 year, 
and then 5 years) 
 
 
No 
 
(2, 3, F) → (5,5, 
PF) → (3,5, PF) 
→ (2,4, PF) = 
Net Change = (0, 
+1) 
 
Decreased by  
(0,1) 
 
 
Yes  
 
(4,5) → (6, 4) → 
(4,5) → (4,4) = 
Net Change = (0, 
-1) 
 
 
Increased by (0, 
1) 
No 
 
4,4 → 7,6 → 6,5 
→ 6,5 = Net 
Change = (+2, +1) 
 
 
 
 
Decreased by (2, 
1) 
Acceptance of 
Electoral Results 
Are elected 
leaders able to 
take office and 
complete their 
term (e.g. does 
the incumbent 
recognize them?)  
Yes Yes Yes 
Subsequent 
elections 
Do next 
scheduled 
elections occur 
as scheduled? 
Yes Yes Yes 
  Transition More 
Democratic 
Transition 
Somewhat 
Democratic 
Transition Less 
Democratic  
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We operationalize a more democratic transition using the variables we have for democratic 
outcomes. Below is the continuum/typology we use to determine and approximate whether the 
elections led to a fuller democratic transition. 
 
Transition More Democratic (need 4/5 to qualify) 
Features of a more democratic transition and long-term prospects for democracy include the 
following:  
 
1. Voter turnout is 67% or higher. While this is high compared to some established and robust 
democracies, a country emerging from the polarizing and fragmented political chaos of a military 
intervention needs broad buy-in to legitimize the process and be reflective of the population’s 
will.  
2. Election day includes no violence. Voting areas are secure and calm. 
3. Political liberalization increases by at least 1 Freedom House point. Political liberalization 
returns to or surpasses pre-coup levels.  
4. The newly elected government is able to take office and is recognized by the incumbent 
government. 
5. The next scheduled elections not only occur on time, but the opposition can run in the next 
election as well and the incumbent has to concede the election if it loses. For true democratic 
consolidation, this process has to happen over the two next election cycles (Alexander, 2002). 
 
Transition Somewhat Democratic (Need ⅘ to qualify) 
1. Voter turnout is 50% or higher. 
2. Election day includes scattered reports of violence or reports are not confirmed. 
3. Political liberalization is stagnant and is about the same as pre-coup levels. 
4. The newly elected government is able to take office and is recognized by the incumbent but 
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may be questioned by the opposition or other political parties that participated in elections. 
5. The next scheduled elections occurs on time but the next leader is unable to finish his/her 
term.  
 
Transition Less Democratic (Need ⅘ to qualify) 
1. Voter turnout is 30% or higher. 
2. Election day includes organized violence or frequent reports of violence, threats and 
instability. The environment is not conducive for voting freely and safely. 
3. Political liberalization decreases by at least one point and falls below pre-coup levels. 
4. The newly government is deeply questioned by the opposition or other participating parties 
OR the elected government is not able to take office OR does so with heavy strings attached 
(must enter into coalition with the military regime, must drastically shift policies, etc.). 
5. The next elections do not occur as scheduled. They may be interrupted by the military regime 
or the incumbent does not want to concede his/her power.  
 
Given this typology, Turkey receives a “more democratic transition,” Pakistan receives a 
“somewhat democratic transition,” and Algeria receives a “less democratic transition.” When we 
look at differences in the explanatory variables, we notice that the greatest discrepancies are in 
timing followed by degree of contestation and opposition inclusion. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The post-coup election process means something entirely different today than it did 30 
years ago. Although it is still the biggest threat to interrupting democratic systems, its effects are 
not as nefarious as they once were before and during the Cold War period. In this thesis, I sought 
to explore a number of cases where democratically-elected governments were overthrown by 
military leaders. I conducted three case studies of countries with similar politico-militarist 
backgrounds and characteristics as initial tests for my theory. I sought to examine how the 
electoral strategies used in a country’s first post-coup election influence the country’s transition 
towards stability, reconciliation and democracy.  
I selected and justified a number of explanatory variables that play a crucial role in 
shaping long-term democratic prospects after forceful seizures of power. These variables include 
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timing, contestation/integration, and military interference. I hypothesized that time is the most 
critical variable in its effects on the prospects for long-term democratization following the 
country’s first post-coup election. Specifically, I hypothesized that gradually introducing 
electoral politics, by a timeframe of three to five years, is an important strategy in influencing 
democratic outcomes.  
Elections on their own cannot be viewed as a cure-all for a country’s democratic troubles. 
It is precisely because of this reason that I thought presenting electoral politics steadily, 
particularly for national parliamentary elections, is a helpful strategy as doing so would allow 
time for widespread reflection on the flawed process that occurred before that facilitated and led 
up to the intervention. A gradualist approach would encourage an understanding that elections 
cannot solve all of the issues that led to the coup; rather that there needs to be a more 
comprehensive and nuanced perspective that allows other changes to take root rather than 
rushing to the ballot box. I hypothesized that temporizing the electoral process allows factional 
tensions leading up to the coup to de-escalate, political parties to regroup, refine and organize 
themselves, and for overhauling reforms to take root in order to move the country out of 
deadlock. 
In looking at the explanatory variables for the three case studies, they all shared rather 
similar or close coding in their indicators for electoral strategies. In all three cases, 
announcements that elections would happen were made soon after the coup. However, 
announcements of actual election timetables were more varying (Turkey 15 months, Pakistan 73 
months, Algeria 41 months). As for contestation and integration, at times I was conflicted about 
categorizing these two factors together, as they did not always seem to reinforce one another. 
Pakistan was assigned a 3, Algeria received a 2, and Turkey scored a 1 (the lowest for degree of 
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contestation and integration). Pakistan allowed no parties to run, but allowed all independent 
candidates to contest elections. Meanwhile, Turkey’s selective screening process permitted only 
three parties to run--none that were active or well known before the coup. In this sense, both of 
these processes were opening up some doorways for new players, but it is difficult to determine 
how they should be scored in relation to one another. Is it worse to not allow any parties to run 
and only independents (huge numbers of them), or to allow only a very limited number of parties 
to run? I thought about how these policies would affect the various political forces in different 
ways: who would be excluded by banning parties altogether, and who would benefit from it (e.g. 
candidates who rely on support from a political platform/collective base vs. wealthy individuals 
with some local recognition who can win votes independently)?  
What is clear though, is that even though both Pakistan and Turkey excluded groups 
because of particular circumstances, they did not exclude only one group; or rather, they did not 
exclude only the main opposition and most recent previous incumbent, as did Algeria’s generals. 
It makes sense that the coup-makers would exclude the main opposition and previous ruling 
party if it had great popular support in relation to the typical voter, since having them run in 
elections would produce the same results the generals sought to annul through their intervention. 
However, what made this factor particularly injurious to Algeria is that it not only singled out the 
main opposition that enjoyed popularity and support from large segments of the population by 
outlawing it, but that it also placed an indefinite ban on the FIS. Election organizers did not set a 
timeline or expectation that this ban was temporary due to emergency circumstances or had more 
to do with specific leaders (as did Turkey by taking Ecevit, Demirel and Erbakan all into 
custody, and emphasizing that these political exclusion laws had some constitutional basis and 
were for a defined period of time) rather than collective punishment and indefinite exclusion 
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(Birand, 1987). 
While time does indeed seem to be a critical factor in explaining the electoral process, it 
is evident that the degree of contestation and inclusion also strongly figure into democratic 
transition outcomes. My hypothesis of delaying elections alone proved to be missing other 
integral factors in place. We saw with the Algeria case study that it fit in the 3-5 year time free I 
hypothesized was needed before reintroducing electoral politics, yet its democratic transition 
both after the election and until today, is arguably the worst among these three countries. The 
period of military rule between the coup and until the first elections did indeed allow time for 
new parties to organize, not just ones loyal to the military regime but oppositional ones too. 
Excluding only one party, the main opposition party that held much grassroots support, 
exacerbates the unequal playing field and hyperpolarization of the country’s socio-political 
landscape, especially when that ban has no expiration date.  
The opposite can be told of Turkey’s relationship with time and competitiveness. While 
its contestation score was also very low (albeit for different reasons) the ban on all political 
activity for three years following the coup was detrimental; however, it disenfranchised all 
parties so that the political consequences for being part of the extreme right or the extreme left 
were similar. In this way, coupled with time, the comprehensive restriction allowed violent and 
igniting factional tensions to de-escalate, as it was understood that the crisis had multiple 
blameworthy parties even if some held more power than others. Targeting all political parties 
alike signaled that this was a civil-military relationship issue, rather than one between civilians 
that would foment more civil unrest. Once the military’s involvement is visibly and highly 
politicized and openly flaunts its partisanship, parties that are directly disenfranchised by this 
disinclination (e.g. the FIS) as  well as parties who boycott in solidarity, (e.g. the Movement for 
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Democracy in Algeria) lose hope in electoral politics altogether as it becomes less about  
mobilizing voters and more about who the army backs. In addition to time allowing tensions to 
de-escalate, the three year interim period in Turkey allowed previous parties to focus on 
rebuilding their organizational power while allowing new parties to enter the scene without 
feeling like they had to compete quickly for votes since this was presented to them as a new 
opportunity. Out of the 15 parties that did emerge after the ban lift on party politics in Turkey, 
only three were allowed to run--but even then they held some degree of competitiveness because 
not all of them were fiercely loyal to the generals in the same way. As it turned out, it was the 
centrist Motherland Party, and not the Nationalist Democracy Party championed by General 
Evren, that took the lead.  
Therefore, based on these findings, there may be benefit to excluding parties equally, 
rather than selectively excluding one or some, particularly those with a large support base. It 
turns out that what we may consider as the least inclusive elections (as defined by how they are 
operationalized in this thesis) may produce the most democratic outcomes (though the opposite 
is not necessarily true).  
Overall, it appears that time and competitiveness are significant variables in electoral 
politics that have significant implications for a country’s post-coup transition and its long-term 
democratic outcomes. Competitiveness and inclusion allows for buy-in across the political 
spectrum, which legitimizes the electoral process by driving up voter turnout. Meanwhile, time 
may help diminish polarization that is often pervasive leading up and during the post-coup 
period. Based on the findings in this thesis, gradually inserting electoral politics three to five 
years after an intervention increases the democratic outcome of the political transition of the 
post-coup aftermath. Doing so allows parties time to internally focus on refining their 
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organizational strength and building new networks and alliances needed for the post-coup period. 
Delaying elections by this timeframe may also help factional tensions defuse, help political 
parties build their organizational strength (that they often lack in “guardian coups” and is the 
reason why they protest the incumbent and demand his ouster), and allows for structural reforms 
that may be needed to overcome political deadlock and otherwise may not happen (undoubtedly, 
such reforms are not always beneficial to the democratic process) (Evans, 2014).  
Furthermore, delaying elections for some time allows the “general’s spell” on supporters 
of the coup and military leaders (especially in guardian coups) to slowly evaporate (Marinov & 
Geomans, 2013). In all of the cases surveyed I noticed that the popularity of the coup leader 
plummeted over time the longer he stayed in time. Disenchanment with the military junta spread 
as more parts of the public began to realize that many of the issues that led to the coup were not 
being addressed: financial distress, instability and insecurity, and socio-political polarization. In 
this sense, over time, the military leaders begin to lose their legitimacy as a political force, and 
more want them to return to the barracks and call for elections. On the other hand, if elections 
happen during this “coup high” the junta has less incentive to carry out competitive and fair 
elections because it does not feel the pressure from the public to do so.  
In the case of Egypt right now, where large parts of the population still highly favor the 
military and few view the military’s intervention critically in terms of what it means for the 
country’s long-term demilitarization and democratization, holding elections anytime soon would 
produce results that only favor and legitimize the military's recent autocratic action. This would  
give the military leaders little reason to reform or carry out an authentic democratic transition. 
There is an incentive, however, for the military leaders to delay elections since it is not in its 
favor to visibly rule during one of the most economically and politically deteroriating episode in 
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Egypt’s modern history. Over time frustration with the junta leaders will grow and such faults 
will be ascribed to them, especially as all other political forces are further marginalized and the 
power of the main Brotherhood opposition is severely curtailed.   
Much has been written on what variables influence whether coup-leaders will hold 
competitive elections or not after their takeover. I sought to build onto this area of study by 
looking at what variables influence whether those elections will lead to more fair transitions and 
long-term democratic outcomes. The strategies used in a country’s post-coup elections are many. 
It is difficult to generalize which factor is most important when many of these strategies are 
particular and unique to the specific case at hand. My findings suggest that among the systematic 
and most crucial factors that determine post-coup democratic outcomes are the timing and 
competitiveness of electoral politics. While the case studies I selected yielded these conclusions. 
much work remains needed on this topic in order to provide more rigorous and solid 
recommendations and conclusions for countries experiencing coups across different contexts.  
Seldom are democratic transitions smooth. It is often troubling to even call them 
“democratic” because of how unorderly, authoritative and chaotic the circumstances are around 
them. The transition following a military coup often is met with disruptive national traumas and 
extraordinary anti-democratic ruptures. It is therefore a painstaking and incremental process, 
where each case is contingent on the historical context that led to it and the political conditions 
surrounding it. A single election, especially after a time as precarious and exceptional as the 
post-coup period, will not solve a government’s oppressive and autocratic tendencies. Rather, the 
issue is more complex and requires policymakers to re-evaluate the institutional frameworks in 
place and what outdated laws, arbitrary regulations, and lack of accountability mechanisms are in 
place. Indeed, the first post-coup election cannot consolidate democracy and it cannot guarantee 
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democratic prospects if there is a lack of democratic consistency thereafter; the tenure of the 
post-coup election government and the subsequent elections should be considered an extension 
of this democratic transition.  
Some pundits, activists and scholars say that elections should not be prioritized in 
discussions on post-coup or post-conflict transitions because they are merely the “cherry on top” 
that should come after conditions of stability and inclusiveness are secured, rather than 
introducing something possibly divisive and distracting to the pressing work that needs to be 
done (Soudriette, 2007). While it is true that elections cannot be ranked as the most crucial 
element in the post-coup transition, they are nevertheless important in stabilizing a country’s 
social and political circumstances and in shaping the incoming state structure. Certain electoral 
strategies--the timing and degree of contestation--must be utilized effectively by policy makers 
and governing leaders to make the best of a difficult and inherently anti-democratic situation.  
Almost one year after the military coup in Egypt, the interim government leaders and 
whoever desires a more stable, secure and democratic transition for the country must critically 
understand what potential the upcoming national election carries. Parliamentary election 
organizers must strategize the electoral timeline and degree of contestation if they strive for 
elections that lead to greater democratic prospects for a country that has repeatedly experienced 
difficulties with its transitional process during the past three years. They must ensure that 
elections are not rushed, and that the will of all sectors of the electorate are not suppressed by 
selectively excluding certain political forces while including and backing others.  
Considering its current political climate and its drastic witch hunt societal landscape, if 
Egypt rushes to parliamentary elections this year, elections will only legitimize the coup leaders 
at the expense of further polarizing Egypt’s socio-political identities. Its elections should be 
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delayed and not held in the state of crisis it is currently in. Pro-democracy forces should insist 
that parties are not selectively banned. Namely, they should advocate that members of the 
Brotherhood be allowed to run even if they disagree with their politics and their short-lived 
mismanaged tenure. They should pressure the Parliamentary Elections Committee, and ruling 
government to introduce parliamentary elections that combine an individual candidates system 
along with an open party list system, with greater space allocated for the latter. This approach 
will allow constituents to vote based on party platforms and will give a stronger opportunity for 
newcomers. However, space for individual candidates should be provide some realistic informal 
inclusion for Islamist parties, specifically the Brotherhood, so that they are not underground and 
radicalized again. The space for candidates should be limited, however, so as not to revive 
remnants of the Mubarak regime who will view this as an opportunity to strengthen their 
political positions.  
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